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ABSTRACT
This study analyses the impact of initial return, post-issue liquidity, and third-party certification
on downside risk of initial public offerings (IPOs). Downside risk, measured by value-at-risk (VaR)
and conditional value-at-risk (CVaR), draws upon Extreme Value Theory (EVT) and the Peak over
Threshold (POT) approach. Initial return and downside risk exhibit a positive association which is
consistent with a market-overreaction explanation but contradicts the validity of signalling models
in which underpricing acts as a costly and difficult to imitate signal of firm quality. Post-issue
liquidity, measured by seven distinct definitions to capture different aspects of liquidity, also has
a positive association with downside risk. In contrast, third-party certification, measured by the
reputation and size of underwriter syndicate and venture capital-backed IPOs do not persistently
explain the variation in downside risk. Quantile regression analysis constitutes more rigour in the
testing and offers new insights into the sensitivity among variables and their covariates at different
quantiles of downside risk. While initial return affects downside risk evenly across the entire distri-
bution, quantile covariates for liquidity measures are statistically significant and generally outside
the confidence interval of least squares regression coefficients. Sensitivity of liquidity measures is
greater towards the upper end of the downside risk distribution.
Keywords: Initial public offerings; downside risk; initial return; liquidity; third-party certification;
quantile regressions
JEL: C21, G12, G32
1 Introduction
There is broad consensus in the literature that initial public offerings (IPOs) have historically experi-
enced relatively low stock returns over three to five years following flotation in relation to comparable
seasoned firms and the stock market in general (Ritter, 1991; Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist, 1994;
Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001).1 Existing research offers at least three
plausible explanations for this persistent average underperformance. Firstly, a risk-based explanation
of low average post-issue returns presumes rational investor behaviour. Studies such as Brav, Geczy,
and Gompers (2000) and Eckbo and Norli (2005) show that low average post-issue stock returns is not
a distinct anomaly. Rather, these returns are, as advocated in Fama and French (1992), consistent
with a more pervasive pattern that is observable in the wider population of publicly listed companies
1This new issue puzzle is well documented in developed stock markets around the world. However, in less developed
stock markets, the evidence of long-run underperformance is less conclusive. For example, IPOs in some emerging
markets appear to outperform rather than underperform the average stock market in the long run (e.g., Jenkinson and
Ljungqvist, 2001).
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whereby small growth stocks experience lower than expected returns. In this instance, low average
post-issue returns are commensurate with the issuers’ typical risk profile, captured by existing asset
pricing models and their corresponding factors, including firm size and book-to-market ratio.
Secondly, low average post-issue returns presume the ability of market timing and the presence of
some irrational investor behaviour. Studies such as Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999) and Michaely
and Womack (1999) advocate that issuers can time their offerings and raise extra capital from selling
overpriced equity, while Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) show that IPO firms engage in earnings
manipulation in the accounting period leading up to flotation. Both instances generate high initial
return, followed by low average post-issue returns due to IPO overvaluation or investor overreaction
when prices adjust to a new price equilibrium that reflects the intrinsic value of stocks. In this
explanation of long-run IPO underperformance, low stock returns are more indicative of mispricing
by issuing firms and their underwriters when pricing offerings or indicative of investor over-optimism
rather than that of a risk-based dimension in the aftermarket.
Thirdly, studies such as Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) and Eckbo and Norli (2005) analyse the
impact of liquidity on IPO returns. Generally, more liquid stocks experience minimal delay in the
execution of trades. These trades have a minimal impact on price changes. Also, more liquid stocks
have smaller transaction costs, including commissions and bid-ask spreads (Aggarwal, Krigman, and
Womack, 2002; Cao, Field, and Hanka, 2004; Eckbo and Norli, 2005). According to Amihud and
Mendelson (1986), expected return is an increasing and concave function of the bid-ask spread. In
the IPO context, Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) argue that issuers may tolerate leaving money on
the table when going public through underpricing (initial return) to create a more liquid aftermarket
for their shares. Initial return increases liquidity in the secondary market (Bodnaruk et al., 2008;
Mantecon and Poon, 2009). Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) make a direct link between initial
return, liquidity, and long-run post-issue returns. Eckbo and Norli (2005) also corroborate this link
in an earlier study. In their analysis, they show that new issues underperform in the long-run because
these IPOs are, on average, more liquid than non-issuing firms when matched on firm size and book-
to-market ratio.
While existing studies have analysed the risk-return profile of IPOs, including the validity of
signalling models, liquidity, and third-party certification, the literature leaves several as of yet unan-
swered questions. To begin with, we do not know much about IPO downside risk post-offering. Yet,
identifying and estimating downside risk is essential for risk management and asset allocation pur-
poses. Only very few studies employ dedicated risk measures. A notable exception is Neill, Perfect,
and Wiles (1999). They use firm-specific betas as estimates of systematic IPO risk. No study in the
extant literature applies any of the more conventional measures of downside risk such as, for example,
value-at-risk (VaR) or conditional value-at-risk (CVaR).2
In addition, we do not know whether initial return, post-issue liquidity, and third-party certifica-
tion, or indeed all three state variables simultaneously explain downside risk. On the one hand, high
initial return, followed by low post-issue downside risk would be consistent with the signalling of firm
quality (Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989). On the other hand, a positive relationship between initial return
and downside risk would embody market timing abilities or market over-reaction to overpriced IPOs.
Alternatively, liquidity measures capture different aspects of post-issue liquidity (Krigman, Shaw, and
Womack, 1999; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998), while third-party certi-
fication in terms of underwriter reputation (Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Carter and Manaster, 1990)
and venture-capital backing (Bessler and Seim, 2012) should reduce downside risk. There is a notable
absence in the literature that analyses the relationship between these state variables and downside risk,
while controlling for firm and deal characteristics as well as contemporaneous stock market conditions.
Finally, not only do we not have an understanding of the impact of initial return, liquidity, and
third-party certification on downside risk, we also do not know whether and how the state variables
impact on different quantiles of the downside risk distribution. Traditional estimation techniques
such as ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) applied in Hahn, Ligon, and
Rhodes (2013) can only offer a conditional mean view of the relationship among variables. These
traditional techniques impose restrictive assumptions on how covariates can influence the conditional
2CVaR is also known as Expected Shortfall or Expected Tail Loss.
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distribution of state variables. Quantile regressions relax this limitation and offer a more complete
characterization of the stochastic relationship among variables. A more complete characterization in
quantile regression analysis is possible because we estimate the relationship between independent and
dependent variables conditional on quantiles of the dependent variable. Since the seminal paper of
Koenker and Bassett (1978), quantile regression has increasingly become a complementary approach
to the conventional mean estimation techniques.3 To-date, we have no clear understanding of the un-
derlying characterization of the stochastic relationship between the three state variables and downside
risk of IPOs.
In light of these unanswered questions, my study makes the following, distinct contributions.
Firstly, I use VaR and CVaR to analyse the downside risk of post-offering IPO returns. Diagnostic
tests reveal skewed, leptokurtic (heavy-tailed) stock return distributions. More specifically, while
extreme negative stock returns are relatively rare, they occur more frequently and are larger in size
than the Gaussian distribution would predict. To overcome the distributional characteristics of post-
issue stock returns, I use Extreme Value Theory (EVT) and the Peak over Threshold (POT) approach
to fit these distributions using the maximum likelkihood method to calculate the downside risk (see
McNeil, Frey, and Embrechts, 2015). POT is the preferred method in the present context because
this approach uses data more efficiently than alternative approaches.4 I estimate conventional 95%
percentile and 99% percentile confidence levels of the return distributions to measure downside risk.5
Estimating downside risk of post-issue IPO stock returns in the context of this study has not attracted
any attention in the extant literature.
Secondly, I analyse whether initial return, post-offering liquidity and/or third party certification,
while controlling for firm and deal characteristics as well as contemporary stock market conditions, can
explain downside risk. To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to analyse this relationship.
Estimating the impact of these two stochastic variables on IPO downside risk is essential for risk-
management and asset allocation purposes. On the one hand, a negative association between initial
return and downside risk would be consistent with the signalling argument of Grinblatt and Hwang
(1989). On the other hand, a positive association between initial return and downside risk would be
consistent with a market over-reaction on the side of investors or mispricing on the side of issuing
firms and their underwriters. Observing such a positive relationship would also corroborate earlier
empirical findings reported in studies such as Krigman, Shaw, and Womack (1999), Michaely and
Womack (1999), and Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998). A positive association between liquidity and
downside risk would be consistent with studies such as Eckbo and Norli (2005). Their study reports
an inverse relationship between liquidity and post-issue stock returns. New issues underperform in
the long-run because IPOs have greater liquidity than comparable seasoned firms. Unfortunately,
liquidity is difficult to define. Accordingly, I use different definitions to capture various aspects of
liquidity and to better understand its impact on downside risk. To begin with, I use spread based
liquidity measures, including proportional quoted spread and proportional realised spread (Amihud
and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001;
Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013; Huberman and Halka, 2001; Rubia and Sanchis-Marco, 2013). In
addition, I use price impact based liquidity measures (Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Glosten
and Harris, 1988; Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013; Kyle, 1985). Finally, I use trading volume related
liquidity measures, including the ratio of returns to trading volume (Amihud, 2002; Hahn, Ligon, and
Rhodes, 2013; Rubia and Sanchis-Marco, 2013) and the number of shares traded in relation to the
number of shares outstanding (Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe, 1998; Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013;
Rubia and Sanchis-Marco, 2013).
Thirdly, I test whether an association between downside risk, initial return, liquidity, and third-
3Previous applications of quantile regressions to value-at-risk include the studies of Bao, Tae-Hwy, and Saltog˘lu
(2006), Fuertes and Olmo (2013), and Jeon and Taylor (2013). Other applications of quantile regressions include the
modelling of return distributions, volatility and equity premium (Hua and Manzan, 2013; Pedersen, 2015; Rubia and
Sanchis-Marco, 2013), risk and stress testing (Bernal, Gnabo, and Guilmin, 2014; Covas, Rump, and Zakrajˇsek, 2014;
Klomp and Haan, 2012), diversification and risk-adjusted performance (Lee and Li, 2012), and foreign exchange rates
(Baur, 2013; Nikolaou, 2008).
4Alternative approaches consist of fitting one of the three standard extreme value distributions (Frechet, Weibull or
Gumbel).
595% comes from RiskMetrics and 99% comes from Basel Accord.
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party certification persists if corrected for potential endogeneity between dependent and state variables.
The literature does not provide a conclusive guidance as to whether these stochastic variables are
endogenous to downside risk. Some studies observe endogeneity between initial return and post-issue
liquidity (Ellul and Pagano, 2006; Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013). This suggests that controlling
for endogeneity is potentially important in the present context. If stochastic variables are endogenous
then they would require instrumenting in the estimation process.
Fourthly, I analyse whether initial, post-issue liquidity, and third-party certification affect the
downside risk evenly across the distribution of dependent variables or whether different quantiles bet-
ter explain downside risk. In particular, I test the predictability of downside risk at various quantiles
in the left tail of the conditional distribution. I use quantile regressions to analyse tail-predictability
without departing significantly from traditional predictive least squares-based regressions. The latter
technique imposes restrictive assumptions on how covariates can influence the conditional distribu-
tions of response variables. Quantile regressions relax this limitation. They offer a more complete
characterization of the stochastic relationship among initial return, post-issue liquidity, third-party
certification, and downside risk. Quantile regressions thus provide more robust and efficient estimates
in some non-Gaussian settings. Since the seminal paper of Koenker and Bassett (1978), quantile
regression analysis has increasingly become a complementary approach to the conventional mean es-
timation methods. However, until now, we do not know how initial return, post-issue liquidity, and
third-party certification impact on downside risk at different quantiles. My study therefore carries out
a more robust empirical test with − in this context − a novel applied estimation method.
2 Relationship to Existing Research
My study relates to various different streams of research and makes several distinct contributions to the
existing literature. Previous research has estimated downside risk using different variable definitions
and methodologies. Firstly, this study relates to the literature on quantifying downside risk and, more
precisely, to the body of research devoted to measure initial return as well as post-issue return and risk.
To begin with, information asymmetry between market participants surrounding IPO values leaves the
new issues market subject to Akerlof’s (1970) classic adverse selection problem. This adverse selection
problem manifests itself in persistent average initial return across capital markets and time periods.6
The literature offers various explanations for persistent average initial return.7 More specifically, Brav
and Gompers (1997), Friesen and Swift (2009), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Ritter (1991), and Teoh,
Welch, and Wong (1998) explain initial return as a consequence of mispricing between an issuer and
underwriter as a result of overoptimism about firm value that creates excess demand in shares, pushes
up prices which then leads to average initial return when post-issue trading begins. Prices then revert
back to fundamental firm value post-issue, which then translates into subsequent average long-run post-
issue underperformance between three and five years. In addition, studies such as Chen and William
Jr (2008), Beneda and Zhang (2009), Falconieri, Murphy, and Weaver (2009), Gleason, Johnston,
and Madura (2008), and Neill, Perfect, and Wiles (1999) link post-issue risk with performance. For
example, Gleason, Johnston, and Madura (2008) find a correlation between post-issue betas and initial
return. These findings imply that IPOs need to offer initial return to compensate post-issue risk in
addition to risk that comes from ex ante uncertainty if investors want to purchase in the primary
and/or secondary market. Beneda and Zhang (2009) report a negative association between the level
of initial idiosyncratic volatility and the post-issue volatility change. Initially, low quality firms have
a greater increase in volatility. Their study reports that initial return and post-issue returns have a
positive relationship to the corresponding idiosyncratic risk levels. Also, Beneda and Zhang (2009)
report that higher long-run post-issue performance has a positive relationship with lower levels of initial
risk as well as decreasing risk in the first year after flotation. The study therefore implies firm-specific
6Initial return is also known as underpricing. Initial return is the percentage change from the offer price to the post-
issue market price on the first day of trading. Evidence of persistent average initial return is available from Banerjee,
Dai, and Shrestha (2011), Ritter (2003), and Jay R. Ritter’s web site (http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter) that
has regular updates of Loughran, Ritter, and Rydqvist (1994).
7See, for example, Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Baron (1982), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), Rock (1986), and Welch
(1989).
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changes post-issue. Initial return appears to compensate investors for acquiring costly information.
In addition, ex post value uncertainty in the post-issue market continues to persist for some time.
Falconieri, Murphy, and Weaver (2009) report that controlling for this ex post uncertainty improves
the explanatory power of post-issue IPO performance. In their study, they use various definitions of
liquidity measures as proxy variables for ex post uncertainty. The literature reports a gradual decline
in ex post uncertainty and risk as IPOs become more seasoned. For example, Neill, Perfect, and Wiles
(1999) report that individual average IPO betas decline over time. The authors attribute this decline
to new issues becoming more seasoned rather than from the delisting of high-value beta IPOs. In a
related study, Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) demonstrate that stocks with higher liquidity betas have
greater expected returns.
Secondly, this study also relates to the literature on measuring liquidity in general and, more
precisely, to the body of research on the impact of liquidity on post-issue IPO performance. The
literature offers a range of definitions to capture various aspects of liquidity. These definitions fall
into three broad categories: (1) spread based liquidity measures, (2) price impact based liquidity
measures, and (3) trading volume based liquidity measures (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan
and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2001; Falconieri, Murphy, and Weaver,
2009; Eckbo and Norli, 2005; Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013; Huberman and Halka, 2001; Rubia and
Sanchis-Marco, 2013). To begin with, Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) report that initial return
increases the liquidity of IPO shares in the secondary market over the first year of trading. These
findings are robust regardless of the time horizon used to calculate liquidity after having addressed
endogeneity concerns between liquidity and initial return. Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) use no
fewer than eight different definitions of liquidity that fall into the three broad categories identified
above. Before the study of Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013), Falconieri, Murphy, and Weaver (2009)
use spread based liquidity measures and volume based liquidity measures. These ex post measures
of uncertainty improve the explanatory power of post-issue IPO performance. In an earlier analysis,
Ellul and Pagano (2006) claim that the less liquid the aftermarket and the less predictable post-issue
liquidity, the greater will be the initial return of an IPO. When comparing post-issue IPO performance
with a seasoned control sample, Eckbo and Norli (2005) claim that IPOs underperform because they
are more liquid than their counterparts matched on size and book-to-market. Finally, the findings of
Eckbo and Norli (2005) are consistent with those reported previously in Corwin, Harris, and Lipson
(2004). In their study, Corwin, Harris, and Lipson (2004) examine the post-issue liquidity of IPOs.
The authors find a steady increase of depth relative to volume and percentage spreads increase in the
secondary market following an IPO.
Thirdly, this study relates to the literature on third-party certification of firm quality. Agents that
participate regularly in the IPO market such as underwriters and venture capitalists can build up rep-
utation capital to certify IPO firm quality. Using more prestigious underwriters and venture-capital
backing should reduce the ex ante valuation uncertainty and hence diminish post-issue downside risk.
Studies that support the certification role of underwriter reputation in reducing ex ante valuation un-
certainty include Megginson and Weiss (1991), Carter and Manaster (1990), and Habib and Ljungqvist
(2001). In contrast, Beatty and Welch (1996) find no support for an underwriter certification role.
Therefore, it remains to be tested whether the present analysis finds a negative association between
underwriter reputation and downside risk. It also remains to be tested whether the size of the under-
writing syndicate, measured by the number of participating investment banks, can explain downside
risk. The number of syndicate members involved in the underwriting should enhance the visibility and
coverage of an IPO and hence reduce downside risk. Analysing the impact of venture-capital backing
awaits investigation and is important because of the mixed findings in the extant literature whether or
not the presence of venture capitalists reduces or increases ex ante uncertainty surrounding the valua-
tion of firms. On the one hand, studies that report a reduction in ex ante uncertainty and hence initial
return include Arthurs et al. (2009), Barry et al. (1990), Brav and Gompers (1997), Krishnan et al.
(2011), Lerner (1994), Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013). On the
other hand, studies that do not find support in favour third-party certification by venture capitalists
include Liu and Ritter (2011) and Hamao, Packer, and Ritter (2000).
Fourthly, this study belongs to the literature devoted to downside risk modelling in the general
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context of quantile regression analysis. Existing research papers in the non-IPO literature use various
methodologies. In a recent study, Rubia and Sanchis-Marco (2013) report conditional tail predictabil-
ity of downside risk using different liquidity measures and trading conditions. The authors apply
quantile regression methodology in their analysis. Predictability of downside risk is robust to various
representative market portfolios and different testing procedures. However, the extent of predictability
varies across different quantiles in the left tail of these conditional return distributions. In addition,
Rubia and Sanchis-Marco (2013) report that volume-related variables are good predictors of well-
diversified portfolios, including the market portfolio and small-cap stocks, while liquidity measures are
more accurate when forecasting the tail of conditional return distributions of value portfolios. Using
an alternative model specification, Taylor (2008) employs exponentially weighted quantile regressions
to estimate VaR and CVaR. This approach outperforms GARCH-based methods and CAViaR mod-
els for a sample of ten stock return series. Some research papers perform more detailed test on the
performance of different model specifications. For instance, Bao, Tae-Hwy, and Saltog˘lu (2006) in-
vestigate the prediction accuracy of various downside risk models, including quantile regression based
approaches. The authors report that the RiskMetrics model performs well in tranquil periods, whereas
some Extreme Value Theory (EVT) based models perform better during more volatile market peri-
ods. In another comparative study, Bao, Tae-Hwy, and Saltog˘lu (2006) report that CaViaR quantile
regression models of Engle and Managnelli (2004) have predictive power when forecasting VaR. Yet
another comparative study is Taylor (2000). He estimates the conditional probability distribution
of multiperiod financial returns using quantile regressions. In particular, his methodology involves a
neural network approach to estimate non-linear quantiles. This approach offers a potential alternative
to GARCH-based quantile estimates.
My study contributes to these strands of the extant literature in several ways. Firstly, this study
measures VaR and CVaR to analyse the downside risk of post-issue IPO returns using Extreme Value
Theory (EVT) and the Peak over Threshold (POT) approach. The extant literature does not pro-
vide any evidence on the downside risk of new issues. Yet, identifying and estimating the downside
risk makes an important contribution to existing knowledge on the long-run performance of IPOs.
Secondly, my analysis examines whether initial return, post-issue liquidity and/or third-party certifi-
cation can explain downside risk of IPOs. There is a notable absence in the literature that analyses
the relationship between these state variables with downside risk. This study employs different def-
initions of liquidity to capture various aspects of this measure and its relative importance with IPO
downside risk. Thirdly, my study reveals and extends the current knowledge in the literature on
whether initial return, post-issue liquidity, and/or third party certification affect downside risk evenly
across the distribution of dependent variables and whether quantile regression models improve the tail
predictability of VaR and CVaR. Quantile regressions constitute a more robust test of the stochastic
relationships among variables than conventional least squares regression analysis.
3 Downside Risk
I use Value-at-Risk (VaR) and Conditional Value-at-Risk (CVaR) to measure downside risk of post-
issue IPO returns. VaR is an estimate of the maximum loss over a given holding period (t) within a
fixed confidence level c. Mathematically, VaR at the 100(1 − c)% confidence level is defined as the
upper 100c percentile of the loss distribution X of post-issue IPO returns. Following Artzner et al.
(1999), I define VaR at the 100(1− c)% confidence level [V aRc (X)] as:
V aRc (X) = sup {x |P [X ≥ x] > c} (1)
where sup {x |M} is the upper limit of x given event M , while sup {x |P [X ≥ x] > c} represents the
upper 100c percentile of the loss distribution X of post-issue IPO returns.
In addition to VaR, I also use CVaR. CVaR is the expected loss beyond the VaR threshold.
Following Artzner et al. (1999), I define CVaR as:
CV aRc (X) = E [X |X ≥ V aRc (X)] (2)
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CVaR measures the average loss of post-issue IPO returns when the loss exceeds the VaR level. Artzner
et al. (1999) recommend this measure to alleviate the problems inherent in VaR.
The risk of extreme losses of post-issue IPO returns and their relationship is at the heart of
this study. Extreme losses represent a significant downside risk to investors. For that reason, I use
Extreme Value Theory (EVT) in conjunction with the Peak over Threshold (POT) method to capture
extreme losses and downside risk (for details, see, McNeil, Frey, and Embrechts, 2015). EVT provides
a conceptual framework that can accommodate extreme observations. To begin with, this approach
overcomes unreliable estimates as a result of sparse data on extreme outcomes. In addition, EVT also
allows a statistical quantification of extreme events that have values beyond those observable over a
limited time interval. The POT method to model exceedances is the most frequently approach used
in finance (see, for example, Gupta and Liang, 2005). Suppose X is a random loss with distribution
function F (x), and u is a threshold value, then we can define the distribution of excess losses over the
threshold u as:
Fu (x) = Pr {X − u ≤ x |X > u} =
F (x+ u)− F (u)
1− F (u)
(3)
for x > 0. As u gets larger, the Fu (x) distribution converges to a GPD. This convergence follows from
the Gnedenko-Pickands-Balkema-deHaan theorem (see, Dowd, 2005). The cumulative distribution
function of GPD is:
Gξ,β (x) =
{
1− (1 + ξx/β)−1/ξ
1− exp (−x/β)
if
ξ 6= 0
ξ = 0
(4)
where G (x) refer to exceedances, defined for x ≥ 0 for ξ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ −β/ξ for ξ < 0. β
is a positive scale parameter. ξ is a shape or tail index parameter which can be positive, zero, or
negative. I fit this GDP by means of maximum likelihood method to those observations which exceed
the threshold in the tail of the loss distribution. I use a threshold of 0.1 to assign 10% to the tail of
the loss distribution.
After fitting the GDP to the exceedances, I use this distribution to calculate VaR and CVaR for
the loss distribution of returns. Mathematically, the loss distribution function F (x) over the threshold
u is:
F (x) = [1− F (u)]Gξ,β (x− u) + F (u) (5)
where x > u with F (u) estimated empirically from post-issue IPO returns. Eq. (5) represents a
parametric model for the tail of the original loss distribution above the threshold u.
4 Data
My sample consists of 2,413 U.S. IPOs between 1985−2012 with an aggregate gross proceeds of
$248.7 billion. Four data sources contribute to the construction of this sample. Firstly, the New
Issues database from Thomson One Banker provides details on IPOs and their corresponding deal
characteristics. I exclude IPOs of Real Estate Investment Trusts, American Depository Receipts,
Master Limited Partnerships, closed-end funds, unit offers, and new issues with an offer price smaller
than $5.8 Secondly, the Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tapes provide stock market
data, including stock prices and trading information to calculate initial return and liquidity measures.
Each IPO must have at least 150 days of trading activity following an offer.9 Thirdly, Compustat from
Standard and Poor’s database offers complementary financial statement data for those observations
that have missing values in Thomson One Banker’s New Issues database. Fourthly, Jay Ritter’s web
8SEC refers to common stock that trade below $5 as penny shares. These stocks are in the highest risk category for
equity investment which involves a speculative element that prompted Congress to pass laws against brokers making buy
or sell recommendations on these shares.
9Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) also impose a 150-day minimum sampling criteria in their analysis to calculate
liquidity measures.
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site provides information on underwriter reputation, issuer founding dates, and aggregate initial return
of IPOs in the new issues market.10
Details on sample distribution by year as well as by industry sector are available from Table I and
Table II. The sample covers a variety of industry sectors. No single year and no single industry sector
dominate the sample distribution which could introduce a sample bias or diminish the generalizability
of the findings.
[ Table I ]
Both the number of IPOs and gross proceeds across the sample period follow cycles similar to those
reported elsewhere in the literature (see, Lowry, 2003; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Yung, C¸olak,
and Wei, 2008). We can observe high IPO activity between 1992 and 1999, whereas the period
before and after this interval shows fewer new issues and relatively smaller gross proceeds. The
highest concentration in the number of offerings occurs in 1996. A total of 260 companies obtain a
stock market listing during that year which corresponds to 10.77% of all IPOs in the sample. The
highest concentration in gross proceeds occurs in 1999. Gross proceeds amount to $23.2 billion which
corresponds to 9.34% of aggregate gross proceeds during that year. The year 1985 has the lowest
concentration in both, the number of IPOs as well as the amount of gross proceeds.
[ Table II ]
IPO concentration across sectors, based on Fama and French’s (1992) four-digit industry sector clas-
sification, is comparable to those firms trading on national stock exchanges at the time of these new
issues. The top three industry sectors, by number of IPOs, are: Computer Software, Retail, and
Business Services; while the top three industry sectors, by gross proceeds, are: Computer Software,
Trading, and Communication. These industry sectors account for approximately 30% of IPOs by
number and by gross proceeds. In contrast, both Precious Metals and Fabricated Products have the
fewest number of IPOs as well as the smallest amount of gross proceeds.
4.1 Variable Definitions and Measurements
Variable definitions on downside risk, initial return, liquidity measures, third-party certification proxy
measures, proxy variables on ex ante uncertainty surrounding IPO value, deal characteristics, and
contemporaneous stock market conditions at the time of flotation along with data sources are available
from Table III.
[ Table III ]
While the existing literature offers several variables that help to explain IPO value and persistent
average initial return, we do not know the importance of these stochastic variables on downside risk.11
I measure downside risk by value-at-risk (VaR) and conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) for confidence
levels c = {0.95, 0.99} as shown in Panel A of Table III. Estimates of VaR and CVaR use Extreme
Value Theory (EVT) and the Peak over Threshold (POT) approach as explained in Section 3.
To analyse the significance of initial return, stock liquidity, and third-party certification on down-
side risk, I rely on variables from the literature that explain the long-run performance of IPOs. Initial
return in Panel B captures Grinblatt and Hwang’s (1989) signalling argument. The relationship be-
tween initial return and downside risk awaits investigation. Initial return (underpricing) is a costly
and difficult to imitate signal to overcome information asymmetry surrounding IPO value between
firm insiders and outside investors. Thus, firms that underprice their IPO should exhibit superior
post-listing returns relative to those firms that do not underprice their IPO. However, the majority
of empirical studies do not detect superior long-run return performance for underpriced IPOs. For
10http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter
11I have constructed all variables with a time dimension in Table III over different time frequencies to detect any
possible horizon effect among these measures. Using alternative time horizons do not significantly change the findings
and conclusions.
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example, Ritter (1991), Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), and Wu and Kwok (2007) report underper-
formance of IPOs for up to three years post-offering. The findings in Gompers and Lerner (2003)
suggest that underperformance, based on cumulative abnormal returns, disappears after five years.
Liquidity measures listed in Panel C, Panel D, and Panel E capture the second set of independent
variables. These three distinct categories include spread based liquidity measures, price impact based
liquidity measures, and trading volume related liquidity measures. Spread based liquidity measures in
Panel C include proportional quoted spread and proportional realised spread (Amihud and Mendelson,
1986; Brennan and Subrahmanyam, 1996; Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2000; Chordia, Roll,
and Subrahmanyam, 2001; Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013; Huberman and Halka, 2001; Rubia and
Sanchis-Marco, 2013). Price impact based liquidity measures in Panel D quantify the extent to which
order flow impacts on prices. These measures originate from Kyle (1985). Existing studies such as,
for example, Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), Glosten and Harris (1988), and Hahn, Ligon, and
Rhodes (2013) use various alternative definitions of Kyle’s (1985) original λ measure. Finally, trading
volume based liquidity measures in Panel E include the ratio of returns to trading volume (Amihud,
2002; Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013; Rubia and Sanchis-Marco, 2013) and the number of shares
traded in relation to the number of shares outstanding (Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe, 1998; Hahn,
Ligon, and Rhodes, 2013; Rubia and Sanchis-Marco, 2013). The ratio of returns to trading volume is
a measure of liquidity. A larger price move for a given trading volume suggests greater illiquidity and
hence higher downside risk.
Measures on third-party certification in Panel F capture the third set of state variables. They
incorporate underwriter reputation, underwrityer syndicate size, and venture capital backing which
should reduce downside risk. Underwriter reputation draws on the ranking of investment banks in
tombstone advertisements as advocated in the studies of Loughran and Ritter (2004) and Carter and
Manaster (1990). The number of syndicate members involved in the underwriting and distribution
of shares enhances the visibility of an IPO and hence improves the aftermarket liquidity of these
shares. Syndicate members include the lead manager, co-managers and other members involved in
the marketing of IPOs. A dummy variable captures if pre-IPO venture capitalists retain a stake in
the post-IPO firm.
To assess the robustness of initial return and liquidity in explaining downside risk, I use two sets of
control variables. Panel G includes variables to control for firm and deal characteristics; while Panel H
lists controls for contemporaneous market conditions prevalent at the IPO time. I include earnings,
assets, and leverage as IPO value drivers to control for firm characteristics. Earnings before interest,
tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) is the proxy measure for operating cash flow because
the latter is subject to higher annual volatility. In the long term, earnings converge to cash flows as
argued in Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998) and Aggarwal, Bhagat, and Rangan (2009). EBITDADum
is a dummy variable coded one if a firm’s EBITDA is negative in the accounting period leading up
to flotation. Aggarwal, Bhagat, and Rangan (2009) argue that negative earnings are more likely
to indicate future growth opportunities rather than current profitability. In their study, firms with
greater negative earnings have higher valuations, which would appear to be counter-intuitive from
a profitability point of view. Book value of assets during the accounting period before flotation are
an indicator of ex ante uncertainty surrounding firm value. Assets quantify a lower bound of firm
value. Koop and Li (2001), Hunt-McCool, Koh, and Francis (1996), and Chen, Hung, and Wu (2002)
use book value of assets as a value driver. Leverage takes account of financial distress of IPOs at
flotation. Firms with higher levels of financial distress have a greater probability of going bankrupt
and hence should experience higher downside risk. Koop and Li (2001) report a negative association
between leverage and firm value. Sales and firm age control for firm characteristics surrounding ex
ante uncertainty surrounding IPO value. Firms with lower sales and shorter operating history should
have higher ex ante uncertainty surrounding IPO value. Hunt-McCool, Koh, and Francis (1996), Koop
and Li (2001), and Aggarwal, Bhagat, and Rangan (2009) report a positive relationship between sales
and IPO value. Hunt-McCool, Koh, and Francis (1996) provide evidence of a positive association
between firm age and IPO value.
In addition, I include deal characteristics such as the fraction of equity retained by original owners
in the post-IPO firm, the proportion of new money raised at the disposal of the IPO firm, offer price,
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number of uses of proceeds disclosed in the flotation prospectus, presence of a lock-in agreement, and
offer size to control for deal characteristics. Firstly, Leland and Pyle’s (1977) equity retention serves as
a costly and difficult to imitate signal in which firm insiders convey IPO value to outside investors to
overcome Akerlof’s (1970) adverse selection problem. Equity retained is a costly and difficult to imitate
signal because pre-IPO owners forgo the opportunity to diversify their personal investment portfolio
at flotation. Secondly, the fraction of primary shares in relation to total number of shares offered in
an IPO signals future capital expenditure of a firm. Downes and Heinkel (1982) and Ritter (1984)
use offer proceeds at the disposal of an issuer in conjunction with equity retained as a joint signal of
IPO value. Thirdly, offer price signals the variance of a firm’s expected cash flows as advocated in
Grinblatt and Hwang (1989). Smaller offer prices have higher variance in cash flows. Thus, smaller
offer prices should have a positive association with downside risk. Fourthly, the number of uses of
IPO proceeds disclosed in the flotation prospectus is a proxy measure for uncertainty surrounding firm
value. This variable could be endogenous to the amount of proceeds and hence I control for offer size.
Previous studies report mixed evidence of the relationship between the number of uses of proceeds
and initial return. On the one hand, Beatty and Ritter (1986) report a positive association. On the
other hand, Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) argue that the number of uses of proceeds signifies a more
specific disclosure and hence leads to lower initial return. Fifthly, a dummy variable captures the
presence of a lock-in agreement. Lock-in agreements prohibit pre-IPO owners from selling shares in
the aftermarket for a specified period of time. Brav and Gompers (2003) and Arthurs et al. (2009)
convey that demand in shares of IPOs with lock-in agreements should be high because investors have
a reduced moral hazard problem during the time interval in which original owners cannot sell their
equity stakes in the post-IPO firm. It is only after the lock-in period expires when the supply of shares
available for trading increases. An increase in the supply of shares could negatively impact on stock
prices as argued in Bradley et al. (2001) and Field and Hanka (2001). Sixthly, offer size captures the
total amount of primary as well as secondary money raised at flotation and is an indicator of IPO risk.
Smaller IPOs are, on average, riskier than larger issues of more established companies. Beatty and
Ritter (1986), Ritter (1987), and Carter (1992) report a negative relationship between offer size and
initial return. Seventhly, two dummy variables capture the demand in IPO shares via price revisions
between the initial filing price range and the offer price as advocated in Hanley (1993). IPOs at the
upper end of the initial price range should perform better than those priced at the lower price range.
Finally, I include variables to capture equity market and new equity issues market activity to
control for the downside risk of individual IPOs. The cumulative contemporaneous value-weighted
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index return and the volatility of this index takes account of equity market
conditions at the time of flotation. Controlling for market conditions is essential because the dependent
variables VaR and CVaR use raw returns. A dummy variable captures if an IPO obtains a listing on
the Nasdaq. This control variable is necessary since the microstructure of this market differs from
that of the NYSE and AMEX. An additional dummy variable identifies if offer date or first trade
date are on a Monday. Jones (2009) report that IPOs on a Monday have, on average, greater initial
return than those issued on other days. A further dummy variable captures the January 1997 Nasdaq
reforms to the order handling rules and subsequent decimalization. Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013)
report, on average, greater initial return for IPOs after this reform. Another dummy variable captures
the 1999−2000 IPO bubble. Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) argue that liquidity during the bubble
period was high, particularly in terms of volume based measures. A further two dummy variables
take account of cycles in hot and cold average initial return in the IPO market. I follow the definition
provided in Yung, C¸olak, and Wei (2008) to differentiate between ‘hot’, ‘cold’, and ‘normal’ average
initial return across the sample period. Studies such as, for example, Yung, C¸olak, and Wei (2008),
Loughran and Ritter (2004), and Brailsford, Heaney, and Shi (2004) report high autocorrelation in
average initial return over time.
Panel I lists twelve dummy variables capture industry sector membership based on the classification
of Koop and Li (2001). The authors use this classification in the context of IPO and seasoned equity
valuation to take account of different ex ante uncertainty and business risk.
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4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics on downside risk, initial return, liquidity, third-party certification measures, and
control variables are available from Table IV.
[ Table IV ]
My sample consists of 2,413 U.S. IPOs between 1980 and 2012 for which a minimum of 150 trading
days and a maximum of six months of daily trading prices post-offering are available. Data availability
for price impact based liquidity measures and spread based liquidity measures reduces the sample to
2,409 observations and 2,286 observations, respectively.
Mean of VaR0.95 is 5.98% and 9.74% for VaR0.99. Downside risk, measured by CVaR has a mean
of 8.42% for CVaR0.95 and 12.65% for CVaR0.99. All four downside risk measures have asymmetric,
leptokurtic distributions. Thus, most values in the distributions are on the left of the mean, with
extreme values to the right. In addition, these distributions have thicker tails which implies higher
probabilities for extreme values than the normal distribution would predict.
All remaining variables of primary interest, including initial return, liquidity, and third-party
certification measures have skewed, leptokurtic distributions. Mean initial return raw return is 19.61%
with a median of 8.04%, confirming that IPOs are, on average, underpriced. Interestingly, IPOs in
the first quantile of observations have market prices equal to their offer prices. The initial return
distribution is asymmetric, right skewed and leptokurtic. All liquidity measures and third-party
certification variables also show evidence of asymmetric, leptokurtic distributions.
5 Impact of State Variables on Downside Risk
Evidence on the impact of initial return, liquidity, and third-party certification measures on downside
risk are available from Table V to Table VIII. Overall, my findings provide the first evidence that
initial return and liquidity in the aftermarket simultaneously explain IPO downside risk, while third-
party certification has no persistent explanatory power. These findings are robust across all estimation
models using different specifications.
Firstly, initial return is positive and statistically significant in explaining downside risk. Thus,
firms with higher initial return suffer greater downside risk. This relationship casts doubt on the
validity of signalling models in which firms use underpricing as a costly and difficult to imitate signal
to convey IPO value to outside investors (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989;
Welch, 1989). Instead, my findings are consistent with those reported in the literature on market-
overreaction. I observe high average initial return, followed greater downside risk which is consistent
with the literature on the long-run average return underperformance as reported in Aggarwal and
Rivoli (1990), Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), and Ritter and Welch (2002).
Secondly, liquidity of IPO shares in the aftermarket also explains downside risk. More liquid shares
have greater downside risk. These findings are consistent across seven distinct liquidity based proxy
measures. My findings are consistent with those studies in the non-IPO literature that examine the
relationship between liquidity and downside risk of stocks such as Rubia and Sanchis-Marco (2013).
Thirdly, none of the proxy measures that capture third-party certification can persistently explain
downside risk. We therefore have to conclude that underwriter reputation, the number of underwriters
in the underwriting syndicate, and venture-capital backing appear not to reduce the downside risk
of IPO firms in the aftermarket. My findings are therefore consistent with those reported in Beatty
and Welch (1996) who find no evidence in support of a certification effect by which more reputable
underwriters should reduce the ex ante information asymmetry between issuers and outside investors.
Fourthly, tests for endogeneity of initial return, post-issue liquidity, and third-party certification
measures in regression models using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test (Wooldridge, 1995) find no evidence
that these stochastic variables are endogenous with respect to downside risk for the cross-section of
IPOs. Thus, instrumenting these variables is not necessary and would only reduce the efficiency of
the estimates. Multicollinearity tests using Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) do not provide evidence
of unstable parameter estimates which would make it problematic to assess the effect of predictor
variables on downside risk.
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5.1 Initial Return
Details on positive and statistically significant relationships between initial return and downside risk
are available from Models (1) across Table V to Table VIII. On the one hand, my findings contradict
the signalling arguments offered by Grinblatt and Hwang (1989). They argue that issuers underprice
their IPOs to signal high IPO value to outside investors. Thus, greater underpricing should signify
better performance and lower downside risk. On the other hand, my findings are consistent with
those reported elsewhere in the empirical literature. For example, Ritter (1991) reports a negative
correlation between initial return and the three-year raw return, measured from the first aftermarket
closing share price to the earlier of the three-year anniversary or the firm’s CRSP delisting date.
Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) also show evidence of positive initial return followed by long-run
negative market adjusted returns. These patterns are not unique to the US IPO market (see, for
example, Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001, for an overview of the literature).
5.2 Liquidity
Details on positive and statistically significant correlations between liquidity based proxy measures and
downside risk are available from Models (2) to Models (8) across Table V to Table VIII. Although the
existing IPO literature does not provide any direct evidence of the relationship between liquidity based
proxy measures and downside risk, while controlling for firm and deal characteristics, my findings are
consistent with comparable tests of liquidity and downside risk reported elsewhere in the literature.
Firstly, spread based liquidity measures, including proportional quoted spread and proportional
realised spread, have positive and statistically significant coefficients in Models (2) and Models (3)
across all definitions of downside risk. Studies such as, for example, Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013)
and Booth and Chua (1996) argue that greater initial return can boost the aftermarket liquidity of
IPOs. More to the point, Rubia and Sanchis-Marco (2013) show that market liquidity explains the
tail of the conditional distribution of daily market returns of value portfolios. In an earlier study,
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) report that market-observed expected return is an increasing function
of the bid-ask spread.
Secondly, proportional price impact based measures of liquidity, including Kyle’s (1985) propor-
tional λ as well as versions adjusted for the number of shares λ CN and the number of trades λ CQ
have without exception positive relationships in Models (4), Models (5), and Models (6) across all
definitions of downside risk. Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) report partial support of a significant
correlation between initial return and price impact based liquidity measures, but the evidence is not
as overwhelming as that for the proportional spread based liquidity measures.
Thirdly, volume related liquidity measures, including the average ratio of absolute returns to trad-
ing volume (Illiquidity), and the number of shares traded (Turnover) all have positive relationships
in Models (7) and Models (8). The coefficient on Illiquidity is positive. Thus, a larger price move for
a given trading volume suggests greater illiquidity and hence higher downside risk. Amihud (2002),
Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998), and Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) report a posi-
tive relationship between illiquidity and return. The positive coefficient on Turnover indicates that
higher proportions of shares traded with respect to the number of shares outstanding creates a more
liquid market in which prices can adjust more quickly and increases the downside risk. These findings
are therefore consistent with those reported in existing IPO studies and the wider literature. More
specifically, Eckbo and Norli (2005) and Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) find that high initial return
has a negative correlation with returns for a given dollar trading volume. Brennan and Subrahmanyam
(1996) report that required rates of return are greater for illiquid stocks.
5.3 Third-Party Certification
Details on the absence of third-party certification in explaining downside risk are available from Mod-
els (1) to Models (8) across across Table V to Table VIII. We have to reject third-party certification
on the basis that underwriter reputation, size of underwriting syndicate, and venture-capital back-
ing variables change their statistical significance depending on model specification or never achieve
statistical significance in the first instance.
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Underwriter reputation never achieves statistical significance in conjunction with initial return
across Models (1) which tests initial return as a signal of firm value or as market overreaction in
relation to downside risk. Models (2) to Models (8) report mixed results in relation to underwriter
reputation and liquidity. The reputation variable changes its statistical significance depending on
model specification or never achieves statistical significance in the first instance. On the basis of this
inconsistency, we have to reject the validity of a third-party certification effect between underwriter
reputation and downside risk. My findings are therefore in line with the notion reported in Beatty
and Welch (1996) that underwriter reputation does not reduce ex ante uncertainty surrounding firm
quality.
Similar to underwriter reputation, the findings on the size of the underwriter syndicate also provides
mixed results. While more models show a statistically significant relationship between the size of
underwriter syndicate and downside risk than in terms of underwriter reputation capital, we do not
observe consistently statistically significant coefficients.
Venture-capital backing achieves no statistical significance in any of the regression models. We
therefore have to conclude that the presence of venture capitalists at IPO have no impact on reducing
the ex ante uncertainty and hence risk post-flotation. My findings are therefore consistent with the
conclusions in Liu and Ritter (2011) and Hamao, Packer, and Ritter (2000).
5.4 Control Variables
Among the control variables, we observe persistent statistically significant associations between down-
side risk and negative EBITDA, assets, fraction of primary shares in relation to total shares offered,
lock-in agreements by original owners, contemporaneous equity market returns and volatility, Nasdaq
IPOs, and whether an IPO occurred during the 1999−2000 bubble years. Firstly, firms with negative
EBITDA in the accounting period leading up to flotation experience greater post-IPO downside risk
than firms with positive earnings. A consistent positive coefficient on this dummy variable across all
model specification is therefore perhaps more intuitive than the view expressed by Aggarwal, Bhagat,
and Rangan (2009). They argue that negative earnings are more likely to indicate future growth
opportunities rather than current profitability. Secondly, firms with a larger asset base have smaller
downside risk. Thirdly, a consistent positive relationship between downside risk and the fraction of
primary shares in relation to the total number of shares offered in an IPO may at first seem counterin-
tuitive. It would perhaps be obvious to argue that higher levels of funds at the disposal of an issuing
firm signals confidence about shareholder wealth generation from future net present value projects.
However, these new projects are often inherent to downside risk which may explain consistent positive
coefficients on this variable across all model specifications. Fourthly, lock-in agreements that prohibit
pre-IPO owners from selling shares in the aftermarket increase downside risk. It is therefore more
likely that an increase in the supply of shares after the lock-in period expires could negatively impact
on stock prices as argued in Bradley et al. (2001) and Field and Hanka (2001). Fifthly, downside
risk diminishes for higher cumulative contemporaneous value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index
returns and the lower stock market volatility. Controlling for stock market conditions is essential
because downside risk across the models rely on raw returns. Sixthly, persistent negative coefficients
on the Nasdaq dummy variable shows an increased downside risk for IPOs on this market. The mi-
crostructure for Nasdaq differs from that of the NYSE and AMEX. Seventhly, new issues during the
1999−2000 IPO bubble experience greater downside risk. Hahn, Ligon, and Rhodes (2013) argue that
liquidity during the bubble period was high. Eighthly, IPO firms belong to Computers, Electrical
Equipment, Utilities, and Retail sectors explain some of the variance in downside risk. On the one
hand, we can observe a positive relationship between downside risk and firms operating in Computers,
Electrical Equipment, and Retail sectors. On the other hand, firms in the Utilities sector exhibit lower
downside risk. All remaining control variables change their statistical significance depending on model
specification or never achieve statistical significance in the first instance. I do not delete statistically
insignificant control variables from the analysis for several reasons. The aim of the analysis is not to
maximize the explanatory power of regression models but to assess the impact of initial return and
liquidity measures on downside risk using an identical set of control variables. Even if these controls
are not persistently statistically significant in my regression models, these variables are normally part
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of the analysis in IPO research. Finally, my sample is large and hence insignificant control variables
do not use up precious degrees of freedom.
6 Impact of State Variables on Downside Risk at Different Quantiles
The evidence thus far shows that both initial return and liquidity explain downside risk of post-
IPO returns, while there is no persistent evidence in support for a third-party certification effect. In
this section, I use quantile regressions to analyse whether the relationships between downside risk,
initial return, liquidity, and third-party certification are representative across an entire range of values
or whether the impact in the lower and upper distributions of the dependent variables change. It
is possible that the covariates of independent variables could change their sensitivity at different
quantiles of downside risk. Therefore, quantile regressions provide a more comprehensive picture of
the relationship among variables than simple least squares regression analysis.
My findings reveal differences on how initial return and liquidity correlate with downside risk at dif-
ferent quantiles as shown in Figure 1 to Figure 8. The coefficients of third-party certification variables
in Figure 9 to Figure 11 reject any support for a third-party certification effect in explaining down-
side risk. Firstly, initial return covariates at different quantiles are representative of the average least
squares coefficients. The majority of quantile covariates for initial return are inside the 90% confidence
interval of least squares regression coefficients. Secondly, downside risk is more sensitive to liquidity
at the upper end of the distribution without any exception. The majority of quantile covariates are
outside the 90% confidence interval of least squares regression coefficients and statistically significant.
Thirdly, with the exception of a few cases, the majority of quantile regression coefficients that capture
third-party certification are either statistically insignificant or outside the 90% confidence interval of
least squares regression coefficients. This finding provides a more robust result for the rejection of a
third-party certification effect.
6.1 Initial Return
Figure 1 provides details of the relationship between downside risk and initial return at different
quantiles of the dependent variable. A positive association supports the notion of market timing
abilities and market over-reaction to overpriced IPOs, consistent with the studies of Aggarwal and
Rivoli (1990), Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998), and Ritter
and Welch (2002).
[ Figure 1 ]
There are very few occasions in which quantile regression covariates fall outside the confidence interval
of least squares regression coefficients. Graphs in the top row show the regression covariates at
different quantiles for VaR and CVaR for confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99}. In the vast majority,
quantile regression covariates (continues black lines) fall inside the 90% confidence interval of least
squares regression coefficients (dashed red lines). Grey areas indicate the 90% confidence levels of
quantile regression coefficients at different quantiles τ . Tables across the middle row show the actual
values of the regression coefficients at various quantiles τ . Tables across the middle row show the
actual values of the regression coefficents at various quantiles τ . All quantile regression coefficients are
statistically significant across VaR and CVaR as well as their corresponding confidence levels with the
exception of τ = 0.95 for CVaR0.95, τ = {0.90, 0.95} for VaR0.99, τ = {0.90, 0.95} for CVaR0.95, and
τ = {0.85, 0.90, 0.95} for CVaR0.99. Tables across the bottom row report tests of equality of quantile
regression coefficients across different levels of τ . F -tests across all τ quantiles show statistically
significant differences.
6.2 Liquidity
Figure 2 to Figure 8 show the associations between downside risk and liquidity for regression coefficients
at different quantiles. The findings allow me to draw several conclusions. Firstly, post-issue liquidity
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does not affect downside risk evenly across the entire distribution. Secondly, quantile regressions
are superior at predicting the tail of the conditional distribution of downside risk. This estimation
technique therefore offers a more complete characterization of the stochastic relationship between
downside risk and liquidity than traditional least squares regression models. I base these conclusions
on the following evidence. To begin with, we can observe positive correlations between downside risk
and various definitions of post-issue liquidity at different quantiles. In addition, we can observe more
sensitive correlations among the variables towards the upper end of the distribution of downside risk.
Furthermore, these differences in the size of covariates between the upper part and the lower end of
the distribution are statistically significant. Moreover, the majority of quantile regression covariates
are outside the 90% confidence intervals of least squares regression coefficients. These findings are
consistent across spread based liquidity measures, price impact based liquidity measures, and trading
volume related liquidity measures.
Firstly, Figure 2 and Figure 3 provide details on the relationship between downside risk, quoted
spread and realised spread.
[ Figure 2 ]
[ Figure 3 ]
Greater spread-based liquidity stocks experience higher downside risk, measured by post-issue IPO
returns. Both spread-based liquidity measures consistently show statistically significant correlations
with VaR and CVaR across confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99}. More significantly, the vast majority
of quantile regression covariates fall outside the 90% confidence interval of least squares coefficients.
Downside risk in the upper end of the distribution appears to be particularly pronounced for those
stocks with increasing liquidity. While coefficients in the lower part of the distribution have values
less than those predicted by least squares regressions, quantile covariates in the upper end of the
distribution of downside risk have greater sensitivity than those predicted by least squares. F -tests
measuring differences between coefficients across all τ quantiles are statistically significant. Even
though my study is the first to make the link between spread-based liquidity and downside risk, the
findings resemble the conclusions in other related studies such as Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and
Rubia and Sanchis-Marco (2013).
Secondly, Figure 4, Figure 5, and Figure 6 show details on the association between downside risk
and proportional price impact based liquidity measures. They are: Kyle’s λ (Figure 4), Kyle’s λ CN
(Figure 5), and Kyle’s λ CQ (Figure 6). Overall, we can observe that price impact based liquidity
measures can explain downside risk, but the evidence is not as strong as for spread based liquidity
measures.
[ Figure 4 ]
[ Figure 5 ]
[ Figure 6 ]
To begin with, not all regression covariates of Kyle’s λ in Figure 4 are statistically significant at
each quantile for VaR and CVaR. However, the majority of coefficients are outside the 90% confidence
interval of least squares regression coefficients. Quantile covariates are statistically significant at the
upper end of the distribution of downside risk, while at the lower end the explanatory power of
Kyle’s λ is statistically not significant. I therefore conclude that the impact and sensitivity of Kyle’s
λ becomes more prominent for those stocks with an increased downside risk. This piece of evidence
helps to explain the marginal statistical significance of the least squares regression coefficient on Kyle’s
λ reported in Model (4) of Table V, Table VI, Table VII, and Table VIII.
In addition, we can observe a similar pattern between Kyle’s λ CN in Figure 5 and downside risk,
particularly for CVaR. The majority of quantile regression covariates are outside the 90% confidence
interval of least squares coefficients and gain increasing statistical significance as well as sensitivity
in the upper end of the downside risk distribution. This effect in the case of Kyle’s λ CN is not as
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pronounced as that for Kyle’s λ and hence the least squares coefficients in Model (5) of Table V,
Table VI, Table VII, and Table VIII are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Finally, the results for Kyle’s λ CQ in Figure 6 show statistically significant covariates at each
regression quantile. The majority of quantile regression covariates are outside the 90% confidence
interval of least squares regression coefficients. Also, the sensitivity of the impact of Kyle’s λ CQ
increases at the upper end of the downside risk distribution. F -statistics tests for pairwise equality of
slope coefficients show that differences between upper and lower quantiles are statistically significant.
Thirdly, Figure 7 and Figure 8 present details on the relationship between downside risk and
trading volume related liquidity measures.
[ Figure 7 ]
[ Figure 8 ]
Greater illiquidity and turnover experience higher downside risk. Both trading volume based liquidity
measures show statistically significant correlations with VaR and CVaR. In a similar way to spread
based and price impact based liquidity measures, the vast majority of quantile regression covariates
fall outside the 90% confidence interval of least squares coefficients. On average, downside risk in the
upper end of the VaR and CVaR distributions have greater sensitivity than those predicted by least
squares. F -tests across all τ quantiles show that differences in covariates are statistically significant.
These findings are consistent with those reported in Eckbo and Norli (2005). The authors associate
high trading volume with IPO underperformance because these stocks are more liquid than a seasoned
control sample matched on size and book-to-market.
6.3 Third-Party Certification
Figure 9 to Figure 11 provide details on the relationship between third-party certification and downside
risk. I find no evidence to support a third-party certification effect on downside risk. With the
exception of a few instances, the majority of quantile regression coefficients for underwriter reputation,
the number of underwriters in the underwriting syndicate, and venture-capital backing measures
are either statistically insignificant or outside the 90% confidence interval of least squares regression
coefficients. These findings provide a more robust test of the rejection of a third-party certification
effect than the results presented in Table V to Table VIII.
Firstly, the majority of quantile regression coefficients for underwriter reputation are statistically
insignificant and/or outside the 90% confidence interval of least squares regression coefficients.
[ Figure 9 ]
Figure 9 in conjunction with Table V to Table VIII therefore reject the notion of a third-party cer-
tification effect using a more robust test. My findings are consistent with the view held in Beatty
and Welch (1996) and inconsistent with conclusion reported in the studies of Megginson and Weiss
(1991), Carter and Manaster (1990), and Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) which claim that underwriter
reputation help to reduce ex ante valuation uncertainty.
Secondly, all quantile regression coefficients for the number of underwriters in the underwriting syn-
dicate are either statistically insignificant and/or outside the 90% confidence interval of least squares
regression coefficients.
[ Figure 10 ]
Figure 10 together with Table V to Table VIII provide further evidence that there is no evidence in
support for a third-party certification effect.
Thirdly, none of the quantile regression coefficients for venture-capital backing is statistically sig-
nificant and/or outside the 90% confidence interval of least squares regression coefficients.
[ Figure 11 ]
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Figure 11 confirms the findings reported in Table V to Table VIII that there is no third-party certifi-
cation from venture capital-backed IPOs. My findings therefore corroborate earlier conclusions offered
in the studies of Liu and Ritter (2011) and Hamao, Packer, and Ritter (2000), but contradict opposing
views held in Arthurs et al. (2009), Barry et al. (1990), Brav and Gompers (1997), Krishnan et al.
(2011), Lerner (1994), Megginson and Weiss (1991), and Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf (2013).
7 Concluding Remarks and Extensions
This study analyses the impact of initial return, post-issue liquidity, and third-party certification on
downside risk of IPOs. I use Extreme Value Theory (EVT) and the Peak over Threshold (POT)
approach to calculate value-at-risk (VaR) and conditional value-at-risk (CVaR). Initial return and
downside risk exhibit a positive association which is consistent with a market-overreaction explanation
but contradicts the validity of IPO signalling models in which underpricing acts as a costly and difficult
to imitate signal of firm quality. Post-issue liquidity also has a positive association with downside risk.
My findings do not support the notion that third-party certification at flotation reduces IPO downside
risk. While some of my findings are in agreement with certain strands of the empirical literature, a
more robust estimation technique with supplementary control variables invalidates some of the findings
reported in earlier studies. Therefore, my findings add to the understanding of both the conceptual
and empirical literature.
More specifically, my study contributes to the extant literature in several ways. To begin with,
existing studies do not provide any evidence on the association between downside risk and initial
return. My analysis reveals that IPOs with higher initial return have greater downside risk. These
findings are consistent with the literature on market-overreaction (Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990; Ritter,
1991; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Ritter and Welch, 2002). My findings therefore cast doubt on the
validity of signalling models in which firms use underpricing as a costly and difficult to imitate signal
to convey IPO value to outside investors (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989;
Welch, 1989).
In addition, the literature offers no evidence on the relationship between downside risk and post-
issue liquidity of IPOs. I use seven distinct measures to capture various aspects of liquidity, while
controlling for firm and deal characteristics as well as contemporaneous market conditions. Post-issue
liquidity has a positive association with downside risk. My findings are consistent with comparable
studies on liquidity and downside risk reported elsewhere in the non-IPO literature. Firstly, quoted
spread and realised spread liquidity measures explain the tail conditional distribution of post-issue
daily stock market returns. This observed impact is consistent with earlier studies (Amihud and
Mendelson, 1986; Rubia and Sanchis-Marco, 2013). Secondly, price impact based liquidity measures
also explain downside risk. Thirdly, volume related liquidity measures all have positive associations
with all definitions of downside risk. These findings are consistent with those reported elsewhere in
the literature (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Datar,
Naik, and Radcliffe, 1998; Rubia and Sanchis-Marco, 2013).
Furthermore, none of the proxy measures that capture third-party certification can persistently
explain downside risk. I conclude that underwriter reputation, the number of underwriters in the
underwriting syndicate, and venture-capital backing appear not to reduce the downside risk of IPOs
in the aftermarket. These findings are similar to those reported in Beatty and Welch (1996).
My final contribution comes from the use of quantile regressions. They help in the analysis whether
the relationships between downside risk, initial return, and third-party certification are representative
across an entire range of values or whether the impact in the lower and upper distributions of the
dependent variable change. Quantile regressions therefore provide a more robust test of the relation-
ships among variables than simple least squares regression analysis. Quantile regressions allow for
the possibility that the covariates of stochastic variables could change their sensitivity at different
quantiles of downside risk.
While initial return covariates at different quantiles are representative of the average least squares
coefficients, the majority of quantile covariates are outside the confidence interval of least squares
regression coefficients and statistically significant. Post-issue liquidity does not affect downside evenly
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across the distribution. Downside risk is more sensitive to post-issue liquidity at the upper end of the
distribution. Therefore, quantile regressions improve the tail predictability of downside risk because
this method offers a more complete characterization of the stochastic relationship than traditional
least squares regression models. Quantile regression coefficients that capture third-party certification
are either statistically insignificant and/or outside the confidence interval of least squares regression
coefficients. This finding provides a more robust result for the rejection of a third-part certification
effect.
Future research can extend the present study in several directions. More comprehensive datasets
from different developed or less developed stock markets will help to corroborate or reject the findings in
the present study. Extended back-testing of out-of-sample tail predictability using quantile regressions
will help to identify the effectiveness of initial return and liquidity in forecasting downside risk for the
purpose of portfolio management and asset allocation decisions.
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Table I: Sample Distribution of Initial Public Offerings by Year, 1985–2012
The sample consists of 2,413 U.S. IPOs between 1985 and 2012 with an aggregate gross proceeds of $248.7 billion,
identified from Thomson One Banker. Sample observations exclude Real Estate Investment Trusts, American Depository
Receipts, Master Limited Partnerships, closed-end funds, unit offers, and issues with an offer price smaller than $5.
Column one lists the calendar year. Column two reports the number of IPOs for each calendar year. Column three
shows the percentage of IPOs per year with respect to the total number of IPOs in the sample. Column four provides
the aggregate IPO gross proceeds in $million per calendar year. Column five shows the percentage of gross proceeds per
year with respect to the total gross proceeds of the sample.
Year
Number of
IPOs
Number of
IPOs in %
Gross Proceeds
in $million
Gross Proceeds
in %
1985 1 0.04 42.50 0.02
1986 117 4.85 2, 368.62 0.95
1987 92 3.81 3, 273.19 1.32
1988 35 1.45 1, 233.79 0.50
1989 26 1.08 819.89 0.33
1990 11 0.46 613.84 0.25
1991 73 3.03 3, 893.98 1.57
1992 140 5.80 6, 057.57 2.44
1993 160 6.63 7, 749.97 3.12
1994 146 6.05 6, 143.17 2.47
1995 175 7.25 9, 179.18 3.69
1996 260 10.77 15, 943.79 6.41
1997 165 6.84 8, 689.90 3.49
1998 125 5.18 12, 393.36 4.98
1999 174 7.21 23, 222.31 9.34
2000 87 3.61 8, 159.08 3.28
2001 32 1.33 3, 368.37 1.35
2002 42 1.74 5, 755.85 2.31
2003 33 1.37 5, 269.29 2.12
2004 96 3.98 15, 881.41 6.39
2005 95 3.94 15, 831.38 6.37
2006 97 4.02 19, 593.49 7.88
2007 84 3.48 21, 788.64 8.76
2008 12 0.50 3, 689.99 1.48
2009 29 1.20 9, 243.18 3.72
2010 54 2.24 7, 983.88 3.21
2011 39 1.62 1, 2556.52 5.05
2012 13 0.54 17, 953.94 7.22
Total 2, 413 100.00 248, 700.08 100.00
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Table II: Sample Distribution of Initial Public Offerings by Industry Classification
Column one lists the industry sector, based on Fama and French’s (1997) updated four-digit Industry Classification (SIC)
code available from Ken French’s web site [http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french]. Column two
reports the number of IPOs for each industry. Column three gives the percentage of the number of IPOs for each industry
with respect to the total number of IPOs in the sample. Column four lists the aggregate gross proceeds in $million for
each industry. Aggregate gross proceeds exclude funds from overallotment options. Column five reports the percentage
of gross proceeds for each industry with respect to the total gross proceeds of the sample.
Industry
Number of
IPOs
Number of
IPOs in %
Proceeds in
$million
Proceeds in
%
Agriculture 6 0.25 301.01 0.12
Aircraft 7 0.29 1, 570.58 0.63
Apparel 33 1.37 3, 319.13 1.33
Automobiles and Trucks 32 1.33 3, 788.56 1.52
Banking 79 3.27 10, 368.63 4.17
Beer & Liquor 8 0.33 279.83 0.11
Business Services 180 7.46 14, 532.56 5.84
Business Supplies 9 0.37 579.02 0.23
Candy & Soda 3 0.12 232.92 0.09
Chemicals 22 0.91 4, 280.76 1.72
Coal 7 0.29 2, 397.70 0.96
Communication 90 3.73 15, 529.99 6.24
Computer Hardware 70 2.90 3, 745.04 1.51
Computer Software 359 14.88 42, 379.70 17.04
Construction 23 0.95 1, 000.80 0.40
Construction Materials 27 1.12 1, 502.30 0.60
Consumer Goods 31 1.28 1, 816.44 0.73
Electrical Equipment 18 0.75 1, 733.03 0.70
Electronic Equipment 142 5.88 9, 888.80 3.98
Entertainment 39 1.62 5, 156.16 2.07
Fabricated Products 2 0.08 224.35 0.09
Food Products 36 1.49 3, 276.55 1.32
Healthcare 64 2.65 3, 937.48 1.58
Insurance 61 2.53 7, 823.71 3.15
Machinery 61 2.53 4, 829.13 1.94
Measuring and Control Equipment 53 2.20 2, 193.07 0.88
Medical Equipment 89 3.69 4, 697.11 1.89
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 6 0.25 1, 483.67 0.60
Other 25 1.04 2, 784.81 1.12
Personal Services 33 1.37 3, 244.96 1.30
Petroleum and Natural Gas 73 3.03 11, 996.46 4.82
Pharmaceutical Products 127 5.26 8, 197.54 3.30
Precious Metals 2 0.08 215.50 0.09
Printing and Publishing 10 0.41 1, 859.32 0.75
Real Estate 10 0.41 568.25 0.23
Recreation 24 0.99 924.02 0.37
Restaurants, Hotels, Motels 50 2.07 4, 298.20 1.73
Retail 197 8.16 13, 677.14 5.50
Rubber and Plastic Products 20 0.83 944.43 0.38
Shipbuilding and Railroad Equipment 6 0.25 483.00 0.19
Shipping Containers 5 0.21 718.03 0.29
Steel Works etc. 35 1.45 3, 654.55 1.47
Textiles 15 0.62 593.60 0.24
Tobacco Products 3 0.12 290.80 0.12
Trading 53 2.20 18, 744.00 7.54
Transportation 58 2.40 8, 345.70 3.36
Utilities 17 0.70 8, 029.65 3.23
Wholesale 93 3.85 6, 262.09 2.52
Total 2, 413 100.00 248, 700.08 100.00
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Table III: Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Column one reports variable labels. Column two provides details on the definition and measurement of variables.
Thomson refers to the New Issues database in Thomson One Banker. Compustat refers to Standard and Poor’s database
and provides financial statement data. CRSP denotes the Center for Research in Security Prices and provides stock
market data. Ritter refers to Jay Ritter’s web site [http://bear.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter] which provides information
on underwriter tombstone rankings which is the proxy measure for reputation. Panel A lists variables on downside
risk. Panel B provides the definition on initial return. Panel C reports spread based liquidity measures. Panel D shows
price impact based liquidity measures. Panel E provides trading volume related liquidity measures. Panel F includes
third-party certification variables. Panel G lists variables on ex-ante uncertainty surrounding an IPO and corresponding
deal characteristics. Panel H provides variables on stock market conditions. Panel I lists Koop and Li’s (2001) industry
sector classification.
Variable Definition and data sources
Panel A
VaR Value-at-risk is the maximum loss of stock i over period m that can occur at confidence level
c = {0.95, 0.99}. Confidence levels reflect those used by RiskMetrics (c = 95%) and Basel
Accords (c = 99%). Daily stock returns for a minimum period of m = 150 days and a
maximum period of m = 6 months are from CRSP . Section 3 provides more details on the
calculations.
CVaR Conditional value-at-risk is the loss beyond the VaR threshold of an individual stock at confidence
level c = {0.95, 0.99}. Confidence levels reflect those used by RiskMetrics (c = 95%) and Basel
Accords (c = 99%). Daily stock returns for a minimum period ofm = 150 days and a maximum
period of m = 6 months are from CRSP . Section 3 provides more details on the calculations.
Panel B
InitRtn Initial return: InitRtn = Pi/OPi − 1, where P is the closing price of stock i at the end of the
first day of trading from CRSP , and OP is the offer price from Thomson.
Panel C
QuotedSp Average proportional quoted spread is the difference between the closing quoted ask price and
the quoted bid price divided by the quote midpoint price:
Quoted Spreadi,m =
1
Di,m
D∑
d=1
Aski,m,d −Bidi,m,d
(Aski,m,d +Bidi,m,d)/2
(6)
where D is the total number of days d for which trading data are available for stock i over a
period of m = 6 months post-IPO, Aski,m,d is the closing ask quote, Bidi,m,d is the closing
bid quote. Bid and ask price data are available from CRSP .
RealSp Average proportional realised spread is twice the absolute value of the difference between the
most recent transaction price (i.e. the closing price) and the quote midpoint prevailing after
the trade divided by the quote midpoint price:
Realised Spreadi,m =
1
Di,m
D∑
d=1
2× |Pi,m,d − ((Aski,m,d +Bidi,m,d)/2)|
(Aski,m,d +Bidi,m,d)/2
(7)
where D is the total number of days d for which trading data are available for stock i over a
period of m = 6 months post-IPO, Aski,m,d is the closing ask quote, Bidi,m,d is the closing
bid quote. Price data are available from CRSP .
Panel D
Kyle λ Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ measures the extent to which order flow impacts on prices:
Kyle’s λi,m =
0.5× (σ2µ,i,m/ΣO,i,m)
−0.5
Pµ,i,m
(8)
where σ2µ,i,m is the variance of daily trading volume, ΣO,i,m is the variance of daily closing
prices, and Pµ,i,m is the mean closing price of stock i over period m = 6 months after the
offering. Trading volume and price data are available from CRSP .
Kyle λ CN Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ adjusted for the number of shares outstanding:
CNi,m = λi,m ×Nµ,i,m (9)
where λi,m is Kyle’s (1985) proportional measure of liquidity and Nµ,i,m is the mean number
of shares outstanding for stock i over period m = 6 months. Number of shares outstanding
and price data are available from CRSP .
Kyle λ CQ Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ adjusted for the number of trades:
CQi,m = λi,m ×Qµ,i,m (10)
where λi,m is Kyle’s (1985) proportional measure of liquidity and Qµ,i,m is the mean number
of shares traded for stock i over period m = 6 months. Number of shares traded and price
data are available from CRSP .
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Panel E
Illiquidity Average ratio of absolute daily returns to the (dollar) trading volume on that day:
Illiqi,m =
1
Di,m
D∑
d=1
|ri,m,d|
V OLDi,m,d
(11)
where D is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in period m = 6 months,
ri,m,d is the return on stock and V OLDi,m,d is the respective daily trading volume in dollars.
Return data and trading volume are available from CRSP .
Turnover Average number of shares traded daily:
Turnoveri,m =
1
Di,m
D∑
d=1
Qi,m,d
Ni,m,d
(12)
where D is the number of days for which data are available for stock i in period m = 6 months,
Qi,m,d is the number of shares traded, Ni,m,d is the respective number of shares outstanding.
Data on Q and N are available from CRSP .
Panel F
UwRank Average underwriter reputation rank is the Loughran and Ritter (2004) update of the Carter
and Manaster (1990) measures ranging from zero for lowest quality to 9.1 for highest quality
underwriters and is available from Ritter.
NumUw Number of underwriters in a syndicate, including lead manager, co-managers and members of the
syndicate that are involved in the distribution and sales of IPO sales. Data are available from
Thomson.
VC-backed Dummy variable coded one if pre-IPO venture capitalists retain a stake in the post-IPO firm, else
coded zero. Thomson discloses if an IPO has VC-backing.
Panel G
EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization in $million in the accounting period
before flotation available from Thomson. Compustat is the secondary data source for those
observations with missing values in Thomson.
EBITDA Dum Dummy variable, coded one if EBITDA is negative in the accounting period before flotation.
Assets Total assets at book value in $million in the accounting period before flotation available from
Compustat.
Leverage Long-term debt divided by total assets at book value in the accounting period before flotation
available from Compustat.
Sales Sales in $million for the last full fiscal year prior to flotation available from Thomson. Compustat
is the secondary data source for those observations with missing values in Thomson.
Age Age of firm in years between foundation date and date of flotation available from Ritter.
Compustat is the secondary data source for those observations with missing values from Ritter.
α̂ Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signal of equity retained: α̂ = EqRet+ log(1−EqRet), where EqRet is
the proportion of equity retained by pre-IPO shareholders in the post-IPO firm available from
Thomson.
Omega Fraction of primary shares in relation to total shares offered in IPO available from Thomson.
OfferPrice Offer (subscription) price per share in $ is available from Thomson.
Use Number of uses of IPO proceeds disclosed in the prospectus available from Thomson.
Lock-in Dummy variable coded one if the prospectus discloses a ‘lock-in’ agreement, else coded zero.
Thomson indicates the presence of a lock-in agreement.
Offer size Amount of primary plus secondary money raised in $million available from Thomson.
AboDum Dummy variable coded one if the final offer price is above the initial filing price range, else coded
zero. Data on filing price ranges are available from Thomson.
BelDum Dummy variable coded one if the final offer price is below the initial filing price range, else coded
zero. Data on filing price ranges are available from Thomson.
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Panel H
MktRet Cumulative contemporaneous value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index covers a maximum of
six months post-offering for which data are available from CRSP .
MktRisk Variance of the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index covers a maximum of six months
post-offering for which data are available from CRSP .
Nasdaq Dummy variable coded one if a firm lists IPO to trade on Nasdaq, else coded zero. Details on
stock markets are available from Thomson.
Monday Dummy variable coded one if the offering and first aftermarket trade is on a Monday, else coded
zero. Dates are available from Thomson and CRSP .
Nasdaq Ref Dummy variable coded one if an IPO occurs after January 1, 1997 to capture the Nasdaq reform
in the order handling rules and subsequent decimalization, else coded zero. Dates are available
from Thomson and CRSP .
MktBubble Dummy variable coded one to capture the 1999−2000 IPO bubble years, else coded zero.
Dates are available from Thomson and CRSP .
HotMkt Dummy variable coded one if the average initial return in a quarter is 50% greater than the three-
monthly moving average, else coded zero. Aggregate IPO data are available from Ritter.
ColdMkt Dummy variable coded one if the average initial return in a quarter is 50% smaller than the three-
monthly moving average, else coded zero. Aggregate IPO data are available from Ritter.
Panel I
OilGas Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the oil and gas industry sector, else coded zero.
Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC available
from Thomson.
ChemProd Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the chemical products industry sector, else
coded zero. Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC
available from Thomson.
Manuf Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the manufacturing industry sector, else coded
zero. Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC available
from Thomson.
Computers Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the computers industry sector, else coded zero.
Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC available
from Thomson.
ElectEq Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the electronic equipment industry sector, else
coded zero. Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC
available from Thomson.
Transp Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the transportation industry sector, else coded
zero. Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC available
from Thomson.
ScientifInst Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the scientific instruments industry sector, else
coded zero. Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC
available from Thomson.
Communic Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the communication industry sector, else coded
zero. Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC available
from Thomson.
Utilities Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the utilities industry sector, else coded zero.
Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC available
from Thomson.
Retail Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the retail industry sector, else coded zero.
Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC available
from Thomson.
FinServ Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the financial services industry sector, else coded
zero. Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC available
from Thomson.
Health Dummy variable coded one if an IPO belongs to the health industry sector, else coded zero.
Industry membership uses the classification of Koop and Li (2001), based on SIC available
from Thomson.
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Table IV: Descriptive Statistics on Initial Public Offerings, 1980–2012
V aR is the value-at-risk for confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99}. CV aR is the conditional value at risk for confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99}. InitRtn is the return after the first day of
trading. QuotedSp is the average proportional quoted spread. RealSp is the average proportional realised spread. Kyle λ is Kyle’s (1985) measure of the extent to which order flow
impacts on prices. Kyle λ CN is Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ adjusted for the number of shares outstanding and closing prices. Kyle λ CQ is Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ adjusted
for the number of trades and closing prices. Illiquidity is the average ratio of absolute daily returns to trading volume. Turnover is the average number of shares traded. UwRank
measures underwriter reputation. NumUw is the number of underwriters in the IPO. V C − backed indicates venture capital backed IPO. EBITDA are earnings before interest, tax,
depreciation, and amortization. EBITDADum is a dummy variable, coded one if EBITDA is negative. Assets are assets at book value. Leverage is long-term debt divided by total
assets. Sales is annual sales. Age is firm age. αˆ is Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signal of equity retained. Omega is the fraction of primary shares offered. OfferPrice is the offer price.
Use is the number of uses of proceeds. Lock − in indicates the presence of a lock-in period. OfferSize is the amount of primary and secondary money raised. AboDum indicates if
OfferPrice is above the initial filing price range. BelDum indicates if OfferPrice is below the initial filing price range. MktRet is the cumulative NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index
return. MktRisk is the variance of MktRet. Nasdaq indicates if an IPO is a Nasdaq issue. Monday indicates if an IPO is issued or started trading on a Monday. NasdaqRef
indicates if an IPO is issued after January 1997. MktBubble indicates if an IPO is issued during the bubble period. HotMkt indicates if an IPO is issued during a hot new issue
period. ColdMkt indicates if an IPO is issued during a cold new issue period. Industry sector dummy variables capture differences in the cost of capital and business risk across
industry sectors based on Koop and Li’s (2001) 12-industry sector classification: OilGas is oil and gas, ChemProd is chemical products, Manuf is manufacturing, Computers is
computers, ElectEq is electronic equipment, Transp is transportation, ScientifInst is scientific instruments, Communic is communication, Utilities is utilities, Retail is retail,
FinServ is financial services, Health is health. Details on variable definitions are available from Table III.
Variable Observations Unit 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
VaR0.95 2,413 0.0406 0.0542 0.0598 0.0729 0.0274 1.2192 4.8672
VaR0.99 2,413 0.0638 0.0866 0.0974 0.1219 0.0470 1.2304 5.0912
CVaR0.95 2,413 0.0556 0.0751 0.0842 0.1045 0.0399 1.2057 4.9278
CVaR0.99 2,413 0.0759 0.1075 0.1265 0.1567 0.0726 1.5494 6.2124
InitRtn 2,413 0.0000 0.0804 0.1961 0.2300 0.4415 5.5829 48.2932
QuotedSp 2,286 0.0085 0.0217 0.0261 0.0367 0.0224 2.0303 11.8246
RealSp 2,286 0.0066 0.0160 0.0197 0.0287 0.0159 1.4385 6.3685
Kyle λ 2,409 Kyle λ× 106 0.3465 0.7030 1.2356 1.3057 2.0832 6.9368 73.7667
Kyle λ CN 2,409 5.1447 8.6150 11.7674 14.4706 11.9317 5.5358 66.2523
Kyle λ CQ 2,409 0.0306 0.0485 0.0627 0.0790 0.0485 2.1505 9.6609
Illiquidity 2,413 Illiquidity×106 0.0169 0.0786 0.5092 0.3461 1.5587 8.8401 117.0808
Turnover 2,413 0.0036 0.0059 0.0076 0.0091 0.0078 7.3446 105.1255
UwRank 2,413 7.0010 8.0010 7.6878 9.0010 1.6698 −1.8808 6.4525
NumUw 2,413 Integer 1 1 1.2254 1 0.6739 4.4168 29.3229
VC-backed 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.1289 0 0.3351 2.2179 5.9191
EBITDA 2,413 $million 0.5610 5.5750 42.3055 21.4520 384.7985 37.4343 1, 622.3410
EBITDADum 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.2292 0 0.4204 1.2903 2.6663
Assets 2,413 $million 15.8390 41.7680 480.6342 179.1660 4, 766.1880 39.7575 1, 786.2260
Leverage 2,413 0.0449 0.2010 0.2686 0.4379 0.2513 0.8641 2.8034
Sales 2,413 $million 18.1210 51.3500 281.7479 167.4510 1, 119.5640 13.2312 235.8592
Age 2,413 Years 5 10 18.6867 20 23.2708 2.3782 8.8852
αˆ 2,413 −0.7360 −0.5226 −0.5816 −0.3526 0.3674 −1.8930 11.0592
Omega 2,413 0.7773 1.0000 0.8664 1.0000 0.2172 −2.0351 7.2879
OfferPrice 2,413 $ 10.0000 13.0000 13.5279 16.0000 5.6709 3.5535 39.8180
Use 2,413 1 2 2.2586 3 1.7965 1.5014 4.9651
Lock-in 2,413 Zero-one dummy 1 1 0.7584 1 0.4281 −1.2088 2.4626
OfferSize 2,413 $million 22.9500 45.0000 110.1034 97.7500 406.9870 27.1196 990.0332
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Variable Observations Unit 1st Quartile Median Mean 3rd Quartile Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
AboDum 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.1774 0 0.3821 1.6913 3.8615
BelDum 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.1720 0 0.3774 1.7406 4.0305
MktRtn 2,413 0.0166 0.0670 0.0585 0.1143 0.0883 −0.9031 5.1473
MktRisk 2,413 MktRisk×103 0.0379 0.0570 0.1005 0.1252 0.1121 3.2110 18.3771
Nasdaq 2,413 Zero-one dummy 1 1 0.7725 1 0.4193 −1.3015 2.6954
Monday 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.0953 0 0.2937 2.7596 8.6145
NasdaqRef 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.4849 1 0.4999 0.0606 1.0057
MktBubble 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.1082 0 0.3107 2.5263 7.3818
HotMkt 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.0431 0 0.2031 4.5053 21.2911
ColdMkt 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.0199 0 0.1397 6.8854 48.3913
OilGas 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.0303 0 0.1713 5.4919 31.1505
ChemProd 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.0634 0 0.2437 3.5876 13.8677
Manufact 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.0352 0 0.1844 5.0486 26.4796
Computers 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.2445 0 0.4299 1.1904 2.4185
ElectEq 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.0717 0 0.2580 3.3246 12.0502
Transp 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.0477 0 0.2131 4.2518 19.0721
ScientifInst 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.0622 0 0.2415 3.6312 14.1823
Comunic 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.0373 0 0.1895 4.8897 24.9014
Utilities 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.0174 0 0.1308 7.3896 55.5852
Retail 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.0688 0 0.2532 3.4116 12.6362
FinServ 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.0841 0 0.2776 3.0002 9.9993
Health 2,413 Zero-one dummy 0 0 0.0265 0 0.1607 5.9006 35.8045
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Table V: Initial Return, Liquidity and Vaule-at-Risk for Confidence Level c = 0.95
V aR is the value-at-risk for confidence level c = 0.95. InitRtn is the return after the first day of trading. QuotedSp is the average proportional quoted spread. RealSp is the average
proportional realised spread. Kyle λ is Kyle’s (1985) measure of the extent to which order flow impacts on prices. Kyle λ CN is Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ adjusted for the number
of shares outstanding and closing prices. Kyle λ CQ is Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ adjusted for the number of trades and closing prices. Illiquidity is the average ratio of absolute
daily returns to trading volume. Turnover is the average number of shares traded. UwRank measures underwriter reputation. NumUw is the number of underwriters in the IPO.
V C − backed indicates venture capital backed IPO. EBITDA are earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. EBITDADum is a dummy variable, coded one if
EBITDA is negative. Assets are assets at book value. Leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets. Sales is annual sales. Age is firm age. αˆ is Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signal
of equity retained. Omega is the fraction of primary shares offered. OfferPrice is the offer price. Use is the number of uses of proceeds. Lock− in indicates the presence of a lock-in
period. OfferSize is the amount of primary and secondary money raised. AboDum indicates if OfferPrice is above the initial filing price range. BelDum indicates if OfferPrice
is below the initial filing price range. MktRet is the cumulative NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index return. MktRisk is the variance of MktRet. Nasdaq indicates if an IPO is a Nasdaq
issue. Monday indicates if an IPO is issued or started trading on a Monday. NasdaqRef indicates if an IPO is issued after January 1997. MktBubble indicates if an IPO is issued
during the bubble period. HotMkt indicates if an IPO is issued during a hot new issue period. ColdMkt indicates if an IPO is issued during a cold new issue period. Industry sector
dummy variables capture differences in the cost of capital and business risk across industry sectors based on Koop and Li’s (2001) 12-industry sector classification: OilGas is oil
and gas, ChemProd is chemical products, Manuf is manufacturing, Computers is computers, ElectEq is electronic equipment, Transp is transportation, ScientifInst is scientific
instruments, Communic is communication, Utilities is utilities, Retail is retail, FinServ is financial services, Health is health. Details on variable definitions are available from
Table III. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively.
VaR0.95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
InitRtn 0.0065∗∗∗
(0.0012)
QuotedSp 0.5475∗∗∗
(0.0513)
RealSp 0.9458∗∗∗
(0.0372)
Kyle λ 0.0007∗
(0.0004)
Kyle λ CN 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.0001)
Kyle λ CQ 0.1766∗∗∗
(0.0110)
Illiquidity 0.0030∗∗∗
(0.0005)
Turnover 0.4214∗∗∗
(0.0854)
UwRank −0.0005 0.0003 0.0004∗ −0.0004 −0.0005∗ −0.0006∗∗ −0.0002 −0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
NumUw −0.0005 −0.0005 −0.0019∗∗∗ −0.0006 −0.0002 −0.0005 −0.0009 −0.0008
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
VC-backed 0.0005 0.0004 −0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 0.0010
(0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011)
log(EBITDA) −0.0009∗ −0.0016∗∗∗ −0.0020∗∗∗ −0.0010∗ −0.0010∗ −0.0005 −0.0013∗∗ −0.0010∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
EBITDADum 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0197∗∗∗ 0.0221∗∗∗ 0.0165∗∗∗ 0.0163∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.0182∗∗∗ 0.0168∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0039) (0.0039)
log(Assets) −0.0028∗∗∗ −0.0027∗∗∗ −0.0025∗∗∗ −0.0031∗∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗ −0.0026∗∗∗ −0.0031∗∗∗ −0.0025∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
log(Leverage) −0.0003 −0.0005∗∗ −0.0005∗∗ −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.0001 −0.0005∗∗ −0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
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VaR0.95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(Sales) −0.0003 −0.0004 −0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0002 −0.0005
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
log(Age) −0.0001 −0.0005 −0.0006∗ −0.0002 −0.0003 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.00002
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
αˆ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0071∗∗∗ −0.0072∗∗∗ −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0027∗∗ −0.0026∗∗ −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0056∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Omega 0.0059∗∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0062∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014)
log(OfferPrice) −0.0105∗∗∗ −0.0053∗∗∗ −0.0040∗∗∗ −0.0096∗∗∗ −0.0080∗∗∗ −0.0083∗∗∗ −0.0085∗∗∗ −0.0104∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0018)
log(1+Use) −0.0036∗∗∗ −0.0015 −0.0017∗ −0.0042∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0036∗∗∗ −0.0042∗∗∗ −0.0035∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Lock-in 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0038∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0055∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010)
log(OfferSize) 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0083∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008)
AboDum 0.0021∗∗ 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0041∗∗∗ 0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗ 0.0023∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0011)
BelDum −0.0008 −0.0022∗∗ −0.0014 −0.0013 −0.0018∗ −0.0012 −0.0017∗ −0.0009
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
MktRtn −0.0339∗∗∗ −0.0296∗∗∗ −0.0240∗∗∗ −0.0339∗∗∗ −0.0328∗∗∗ −0.0387∗∗∗ −0.0299∗∗∗ −0.0364∗∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0050) (0.0055) (0.0056)
MktRisk 0.0670∗∗∗ 0.0564∗∗∗ 0.0534∗∗∗ 0.0622∗∗∗ 0.0582∗∗∗ 0.0477∗∗∗ 0.0603∗∗∗ 0.0659∗∗∗
(0.0060) (0.0053) (0.0050) (0.0060) (0.0061) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0059)
Nasdaq 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0015 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0099∗∗∗ 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗ 0.0068∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Monday 0.0029∗∗ 0.0024∗∗ 0.0018 0.0029∗∗ 0.0029∗∗ 0.0031∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗ 0.0030∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013)
NasdaqRef −0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0070∗∗∗ −0.0041∗∗∗ −0.0040∗∗∗ −0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0039∗∗∗ −0.0046∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011)
MktBubble 0.0289∗∗∗ 0.0291∗∗∗ 0.0282∗∗∗ 0.0307∗∗∗ 0.0305∗∗∗ 0.0234∗∗∗ 0.0312∗∗∗ 0.0292∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0019)
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VaR0.95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HotMkt 0.0023 0.0035∗ 0.0032∗ 0.0030 0.0027 0.0019 0.0031∗ 0.0031∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018)
ColdMkt 0.0054∗ 0.0030 0.0035 0.0052∗ 0.0058∗ 0.0057∗∗ 0.0057∗ 0.0052∗
(0.0031) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0030)
OilGas −0.0017 −0.0008 −0.0019 −0.0022 −0.0024 −0.0031∗ −0.0020 −0.0016
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0020)
ChemProd −0.0012 −0.0017 −0.0020 −0.0021 −0.0025 −0.0004 −0.0022 −0.0010
(0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Manuf 0.0008 0.0026∗ 0.0032∗∗ 0.0016 0.0016 0.0012 0.0020 0.0012
(0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0018)
Computers 0.0049∗∗∗ 0.0071∗∗∗ 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0049∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012)
ElectEq 0.0073∗∗∗ 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0070∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017)
Transp −0.0013 0.0008 0.0004 −0.0012 −0.0009 −0.0010 −0.0007 −0.0013
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015)
ScientificInst 0.0017 0.0021 0.0021 0.0016 0.0016 0.0022 0.0018 0.0020
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Communic 0.0007 −0.0013 −0.0025 −0.0003 0.0009 0.0011 −0.0010 −0.0007
(0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Utilities −0.0084∗∗∗ −0.0068∗∗∗ −0.0079∗∗∗ −0.0086∗∗∗ −0.0084∗∗∗ −0.0072∗∗∗ −0.0076∗∗∗ −0.0083∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022)
Retail 0.0016 0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0014 0.0015 −0.0002 0.0023∗ 0.0013
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014)
FinServ −0.0023 −0.0018 −0.0021 −0.0022 −0.0020 −0.0013 −0.0022 −0.0019
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Health −0.0018 −0.0003 −0.00003 −0.0017 −0.0019 −0.0022 −0.0011 −0.0016
(0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Constant 0.0653∗∗∗ 0.0126∗∗ 0.0078∗ 0.0597∗∗∗ 0.0579∗∗∗ 0.0608∗∗∗ 0.0512∗∗∗ 0.0658∗∗∗
(0.0042) (0.0055) (0.0043) (0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0040) (0.0044) (0.0044)
Observations 2, 413 2, 286 2, 286 2, 409 2, 409 2, 409 2, 413 2, 413
Adjusted R2 0.6022 0.6819 0.7078 0.5956 0.6026 0.6578 0.6178 0.6056
F Statistic 97.0901∗∗∗ 129.9146∗∗∗ 146.6713∗∗∗ 94.3250∗∗∗ 97.1065∗∗∗ 122.8335∗∗∗ 103.5879∗∗∗ 98.4576∗∗∗
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Table VI: Initial Return, Liquidity and Vaule-at-Risk for Confidence Level c = 0.99
V aR is the value-at-risk for confidence level c = 0.95. InitRtn is the return after the first day of trading. QuotedSp is the average proportional quoted spread. RealSp is the average
proportional realised spread. Kyle λ is Kyle’s (1985) measure of the extent to which order flow impacts on prices. Kyle λ CN is Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ adjusted for the number
of shares outstanding and closing prices. Kyle λ CQ is Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ adjusted for the number of trades and closing prices. Illiquidity is the average ratio of absolute
daily returns to trading volume. Turnover is the average number of shares traded. UwRank measures underwriter reputation. NumUw is the number of underwriters in the IPO.
V C − backed indicates venture capital backed IPO. EBITDA are earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. EBITDADum is a dummy variable, coded one if
EBITDA is negative. Assets are assets at book value. Leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets. Sales is annual sales. Age is firm age. αˆ is Leland and Pyle’s (1977) signal
of equity retained. Omega is the fraction of primary shares offered. OfferPrice is the offer price. Use is the number of uses of proceeds. Lock− in indicates the presence of a lock-in
period. OfferSize is the amount of primary and secondary money raised. AboDum indicates if OfferPrice is above the initial filing price range. BelDum indicates if OfferPrice
is below the initial filing price range. MktRet is the cumulative NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index return. MktRisk is the variance of MktRet. Nasdaq indicates if an IPO is a Nasdaq
issue. Monday indicates if an IPO is issued or started trading on a Monday. NasdaqRef indicates if an IPO is issued after January 1997. MktBubble indicates if an IPO is issued
during the bubble period. HotMkt indicates if an IPO is issued during a hot new issue period. ColdMkt indicates if an IPO is issued during a cold new issue period. Industry sector
dummy variables capture differences in the cost of capital and business risk across industry sectors based on Koop and Li’s (2001) 12-industry sector classification: OilGas is oil
and gas, ChemProd is chemical products, Manuf is manufacturing, Computers is computers, ElectEq is electronic equipment, Transp is transportation, ScientifInst is scientific
instruments, Communic is communication, Utilities is utilities, Retail is retail, FinServ is financial services, Health is health. Details on variable definitions are available from
Table III. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. Significance levels are adjusted for robust standard errors.
VaR0.95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
InitRtn 0.0077∗∗∗
(0.0023)
QuotedSp 0.7719∗∗∗
(0.0793)
RealSp 1.2794∗∗∗
(0.0757)
Kyle λ 0.0016∗∗
(0.0007)
Kyle λ CN 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001)
Kyle λ CQ 0.2923∗∗∗
(0.0212)
Illiquidity 0.0039∗∗∗
(0.0008)
Turnover 0.6581∗∗∗
(0.1556)
UwRank 0.0001 0.0013∗∗ 0.0014∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.00005 0.000001 0.0005 0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
NumUw −0.0019 −0.0022∗∗ −0.0041∗∗∗ −0.0022∗ −0.0014 −0.0020∗ −0.0024∗∗ −0.0024∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0010)
VC-backed 0.0019 0.0013 0.0006 0.0016 0.0015 0.0013 0.0018 0.0027
(0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019)
log(EBITDA) −0.0020∗∗ −0.0029∗∗∗ −0.0035∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗ −0.0022∗∗ −0.0013 −0.0025∗∗∗ −0.0021∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
EBITDADum 0.0290∗∗∗ 0.0341∗∗∗ 0.0371∗∗∗ 0.0296∗∗∗ 0.0295∗∗∗ 0.0201∗∗∗ 0.0320∗∗∗ 0.0301∗∗∗
(0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0070) (0.0064) (0.0071) (0.0070)
log(Assets) −0.0056∗∗∗ −0.0052∗∗∗ −0.0051∗∗∗ −0.0060∗∗∗ −0.0064∗∗∗ −0.0051∗∗∗ −0.0059∗∗∗ −0.0050∗∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0010)
log(Leverage) −0.0003 −0.0007 −0.0006 −0.0004 −0.0004 0.0001 −0.0005 −0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
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Table VI — Continued
VaR0.99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(Sales) 0.0007 0.0005 0.0006 0.0007 0.0010 0.0010 0.0008 0.0004
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
log(Age) −0.0008 −0.0014∗∗ −0.0014∗∗ −0.0010 −0.0011 −0.0008 −0.0008 −0.0007
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
αˆ −0.0065∗∗∗ −0.0104∗∗∗ −0.0105∗∗∗ −0.0080∗∗∗ −0.0033 −0.0032∗ −0.0078∗∗∗ −0.0082∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0021)
Omega 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0102∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0108∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0027)
log(OfferPrice) −0.0127∗∗∗ −0.0057∗ −0.0042 −0.0122∗∗∗ −0.0093∗∗∗ −0.0098∗∗∗ −0.0103∗∗∗ −0.0131∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0034)
log(1+Use) −0.0058∗∗∗ −0.0034∗ −0.0038∗∗ −0.0069∗∗∗ −0.0069∗∗∗ −0.0056∗∗∗ −0.0065∗∗∗ −0.0055∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Lock-in 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0066∗∗∗ 0.0064∗∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0066∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019)
log(OfferSize) 0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗ 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0027∗∗ 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0040∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015)
AboDum 0.0032∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗ 0.0051∗∗∗ 0.0030∗ 0.0045∗∗ 0.0045∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0020)
BelDum −0.0001 −0.0019 −0.0009 −0.0008 −0.0016 −0.0005 −0.0013 −0.0001
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0020)
MktRtn −0.0587∗∗∗ −0.0548∗∗∗ −0.0475∗∗∗ −0.0592∗∗∗ −0.0569∗∗∗ −0.0669∗∗∗ −0.0536∗∗∗ −0.0629∗∗∗
(0.0112) (0.0110) (0.0108) (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.0103) (0.0110) (0.0112)
MktRisk 0.1271∗∗∗ 0.1082∗∗∗ 0.1050∗∗∗ 0.1181∗∗∗ 0.1133∗∗∗ 0.0964∗∗∗ 0.1187∗∗∗ 0.1258∗∗∗
(0.0124) (0.0120) (0.0118) (0.0125) (0.0128) (0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0122)
Nasdaq 0.0112∗∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0032 0.0131∗∗∗ 0.0144∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0095∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Monday 0.0031 0.0023 0.0016 0.0031 0.0031 0.0034 0.0033 0.0033
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022)
NasdaqRef −0.0036 0.0101∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ −0.0025 −0.0025 −0.0019 −0.0023 −0.0033
(0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022)
MktBubble 0.0408∗∗∗ 0.0408∗∗∗ 0.0397∗∗∗ 0.0431∗∗∗ 0.0426∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0436∗∗∗ 0.0407∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0033) (0.0033)
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Table VI — Continued
VaR0.99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HotMkt 0.0035 0.0049 0.0045 0.0044 0.0037 0.0024 0.0044 0.0044
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0033)
ColdMkt 0.0074 0.0029 0.0036 0.0073 0.0082∗ 0.0081∗ 0.0078 0.0072
(0.0050) (0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0043) (0.0050) (0.0049)
OilGas −0.0043 −0.0029 −0.0045 −0.0050 −0.0053 −0.0064∗∗ −0.0046 −0.0039
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0035) (0.0035)
ChemProd −0.0012 −0.0020 −0.0024 −0.0023 −0.0029 0.0005 −0.0024 −0.0006
(0.0032) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0031)
Manuf 0.0004 0.0033 0.0040 0.0016 0.0015 0.0008 0.0018 0.0008
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
Computers 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0095∗∗∗ 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0100∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022)
ElectEq 0.0118∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0119∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗ 0.0121∗∗∗ 0.0112∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0031)
Transp −0.0026 0.0003 −0.0003 −0.0024 −0.0019 −0.0022 −0.0018 −0.0027
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0032)
ScientificInst 0.0042 0.0042 0.0042 0.0041 0.0041 0.0051∗ 0.0044 0.0047
(0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0032)
Communic 0.0012 −0.0013 −0.0027 −0.0003 0.0020 0.0023 −0.0009 −0.0007
(0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0037)
Utilities −0.0124∗∗∗ −0.0114∗∗∗ −0.0130∗∗∗ −0.0126∗∗∗ −0.0123∗∗∗ −0.0103∗∗ −0.0113∗∗∗ −0.0121∗∗∗
(0.0046) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0045)
Retail 0.0058∗∗ 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗ 0.0057∗∗ 0.0028 0.0066∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0026)
FinServ −0.0027 −0.0031 −0.0034 −0.0027 −0.0021 −0.0011 −0.0026 −0.0022
(0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0029)
Health −0.0019 0.0008 0.0010 −0.0018 −0.0022 −0.0026 −0.0011 −0.0017
(0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Constant 0.0943∗∗∗ 0.0173∗ 0.0138 0.0836∗∗∗ 0.0827∗∗∗ 0.0879∗∗∗ 0.0765∗∗∗ 0.0958∗∗∗
(0.0075) (0.0099) (0.0087) (0.0083) (0.0077) (0.0070) (0.0078) (0.0077)
Observations 2, 413 2, 286 2, 286 2, 409 2, 409 2, 409 2, 413 2, 413
Adjusted R2 0.5272 0.5798 0.5915 0.5260 0.5317 0.5824 0.5364 0.5330
F Statistic 71.7667∗∗∗ 83.9742∗∗∗ 88.0654∗∗∗ 71.3325∗∗∗ 72.9485∗∗∗ 89.3605∗∗∗ 74.4509∗∗∗ 73.4306∗∗∗
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Table VII: Initial Return, Liquidity and Conditional Vaule-at-Risk for Confidence Level c = 0.95
CV aR is the conditional value-at-risk for confidence level c = 0.95. InitRtn is the return after the first day of trading. QuotedSp is the average proportional quoted spread. RealSp is
the average proportional realised spread. Kyle λ is Kyle’s (1985) measure of the extent to which order flow impacts on prices. Kyle λ CN is Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ adjusted for
the number of shares outstanding and closing prices. Kyle λ CQ is Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ adjusted for the number of trades and closing prices. Illiquidity is the average ratio
of absolute daily returns to trading volume. Turnover is the average number of shares traded. UwRank measures underwriter reputation. NumUw is the number of underwriters in
the IPO. V C − backed indicates venture capital backed IPO. EBITDA are earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. EBITDADum is a dummy variable, coded
one if EBITDA is negative. Assets are assets at book value. Leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets. Sales is annual sales. Age is firm age. αˆ is Leland and Pyle’s (1977)
signal of equity retained. Omega is the fraction of primary shares offered. OfferPrice is the offer price. Use is the number of uses of proceeds. Lock − in indicates the presence of
a lock-in period. OfferSize is the amount of primary and secondary money raised. AboDum indicates if OfferPrice is above the initial filing price range. BelDum indicates if
OfferPrice is below the initial filing price range. MktRet is the cumulative NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index return. MktRisk is the variance of MktRet. Nasdaq indicates if an IPO
is a Nasdaq issue. Monday indicates if an IPO is issued or started trading on a Monday. NasdaqRef indicates if an IPO is issued after January 1997. MktBubble indicates if an
IPO is issued during the bubble period. HotMkt indicates if an IPO is issued during a hot new issue period. ColdMkt indicates if an IPO is issued during a cold new issue period.
Industry sector dummy variables capture differences in the cost of capital and business risk across industry sectors based on Koop and Li’s (2001) 12-industry sector classification:
OilGas is oil and gas, ChemProd is chemical products, Manuf is manufacturing, Computers is computers, ElectEq is electronic equipment, Transp is transportation, ScientifInst
is scientific instruments, Communic is communication, Utilities is utilities, Retail is retail, FinServ is financial services, Health is health. Details on variable definitions are available
from Table III. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. Significance levels are adjusted for robust standard errors.
CVaR0.95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
InitRtn 0.0070∗∗∗
(0.0018)
QuotedSp 0.6905∗∗∗
(0.0688)
RealSp 1.1485∗∗∗
(0.0615)
Kyle λ 0.0013∗∗
(0.0006)
Kyle λ CN 0.0004∗∗∗
(0.0001)
Kyle λ CQ 0.2514∗∗∗
(0.0176)
Illiquidity 0.0036∗∗∗
(0.0007)
Turnover 0.5817∗∗∗
(0.1321)
UwRank −0.0001 0.0010∗∗ 0.0010∗∗ 0.00004 −0.0001 −0.0002 0.0003 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
NumUw −0.0015 −0.0017∗ −0.0034∗∗∗ −0.0017∗ −0.0010 −0.0016∗ −0.0019∗∗ −0.0019∗∗
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)
VC-backed 0.0014 0.0010 0.0004 0.0011 0.0010 0.0009 0.0013 0.0021
(0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016)
log(EBITDA) −0.0016∗∗ −0.0024∗∗∗ −0.0029∗∗∗ −0.0016∗∗ −0.0017∗∗ −0.0009 −0.0020∗∗∗ −0.0016∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008)
EBITDADum 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0283∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗ 0.0242∗∗∗ 0.0241∗∗∗ 0.0161∗∗∗ 0.0264∗∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0053) (0.0059) (0.0059)
log(Assets) −0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0044∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0050∗∗∗ −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0050∗∗∗ −0.0042∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009)
log(Leverage) −0.0003 −0.0006∗ −0.0005 −0.0003 −0.0004 0.0001 −0.0005 −0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
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Table VII — Continued
CVaR0.95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(Sales) 0.0004 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0007 0.0008 0.0005 0.0002
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007)
log(Age) −0.0006 −0.0011∗∗ −0.0012∗∗ −0.0007 −0.0009 −0.0006 −0.0006 −0.0005
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006)
αˆ −0.0055∗∗∗ −0.0090∗∗∗ −0.0092∗∗∗ −0.0069∗∗∗ −0.0029∗ −0.0028∗ −0.0068∗∗∗ −0.0071∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0018)
Omega 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗∗ 0.0090∗∗∗ 0.0090∗∗∗ 0.0088∗∗∗ 0.0075∗∗∗ 0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0084∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0023)
log(OfferPrice) −0.0119∗∗∗ −0.0056∗∗ −0.0042 −0.0114∗∗∗ −0.0089∗∗∗ −0.0093∗∗∗ −0.0097∗∗∗ −0.0122∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0028)
log(1+Use) −0.0050∗∗∗ −0.0028∗ −0.0032∗∗ −0.0059∗∗∗ −0.0059∗∗∗ −0.0049∗∗∗ −0.0057∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Lock-in 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0056∗∗∗ 0.0054∗∗∗ 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0060∗∗∗ 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0070∗∗∗ 0.0058∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016)
log(OfferSize) 0.0045∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗ 0.0063∗∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗ 0.0065∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0013)
AboDum 0.0029∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0050∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗∗ 0.0046∗∗∗ 0.0029∗ 0.0041∗∗ 0.0041∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016)
BelDum −0.0004 −0.0020 −0.0010 −0.0010 −0.0017 −0.0008 −0.0014 −0.0004
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016)
MktRtn −0.0506∗∗∗ −0.0470∗∗∗ −0.0404∗∗∗ −0.0509∗∗∗ −0.0491∗∗∗ −0.0576∗∗∗ −0.0460∗∗∗ −0.0543∗∗∗
(0.0094) (0.0091) (0.0089) (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0086) (0.0091) (0.0093)
MktRisk 0.1069∗∗∗ 0.0896∗∗∗ 0.0867∗∗∗ 0.0994∗∗∗ 0.0949∗∗∗ 0.0803∗∗∗ 0.0992∗∗∗ 0.1057∗∗∗
(0.0101) (0.0096) (0.0094) (0.0102) (0.0104) (0.0096) (0.0097) (0.0100)
Nasdaq 0.0097∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0026 0.0113∗∗∗ 0.0125∗∗∗ 0.0094∗∗∗ 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0082∗∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Monday 0.0025 0.0018 0.0012 0.0025 0.0025 0.0028 0.0027 0.0027
(0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0019)
NasdaqRef −0.0037∗∗ 0.0085∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗ −0.0028 −0.0028 −0.0023 −0.0026 −0.0035∗
(0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018)
MktBubble 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.0353∗∗∗ 0.0383∗∗∗ 0.0379∗∗∗ 0.0279∗∗∗ 0.0388∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0028)
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Table VII — Continued
CVaR0.95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HotMkt 0.0029 0.0043 0.0039 0.0037 0.0031 0.0020 0.0037 0.0038
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0026) (0.0028) (0.0028)
ColdMkt 0.0064 0.0027 0.0034 0.0062 0.0071∗ 0.0069∗ 0.0068 0.0062
(0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0041) (0.0041)
OilGas −0.0039 −0.0025 −0.0039 −0.0045 −0.0048 −0.0057∗∗ −0.0041 −0.0036
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0029)
ChemProd −0.0010 −0.0016 −0.0019 −0.0019 −0.0024 0.0005 −0.0020 −0.0005
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0027)
Manuf 0.0006 0.0032 0.0038 0.0016 0.0016 0.0010 0.0019 0.0010
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Computers 0.0074∗∗∗ 0.0102∗∗∗ 0.0100∗∗∗ 0.0080∗∗∗ 0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0073∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018)
ElectEq 0.0102∗∗∗ 0.0127∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0103∗∗∗ 0.0110∗∗∗ 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0105∗∗∗ 0.0097∗∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0026)
Transp −0.0021 0.0006 0.0001 −0.0019 −0.0014 −0.0017 −0.0014 −0.0022
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0027)
ScientificInst 0.0033 0.0036 0.0035 0.0033 0.0033 0.0041∗ 0.0035 0.0038
(0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0027)
Communic 0.0009 −0.0013 −0.0026 −0.0003 0.0016 0.0018 −0.0010 −0.0007
(0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0027) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0031)
Utilities −0.0110∗∗∗ −0.0097∗∗∗ −0.0111∗∗∗ −0.0112∗∗∗ −0.0109∗∗∗ −0.0093∗∗ −0.0101∗∗∗ −0.0107∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0037)
Retail 0.0045∗∗ 0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗ 0.0045∗∗ 0.0019 0.0053∗∗ 0.0041∗
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022)
FinServ −0.0027 −0.0029 −0.0032 −0.0027 −0.0023 −0.0014 −0.0027 −0.0023
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0024)
Health −0.0018 0.0005 0.0007 −0.0017 −0.0020 −0.0024 −0.0010 −0.0016
(0.0040) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0040)
Constant 0.0849∗∗∗ 0.0161∗ 0.0128∗ 0.0759∗∗∗ 0.0748∗∗∗ 0.0792∗∗∗ 0.0685∗∗∗ 0.0861∗∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0083) (0.0072) (0.0070) (0.0065) (0.0059) (0.0066) (0.0065)
Observations 2, 413 2, 286 2, 286 2, 409 2, 409 2, 409 2, 413 2, 413
Adjusted R2 0.5427 0.6007 0.6142 0.5407 0.5467 0.5987 0.5535 0.5486
F Statistic 76.3135∗∗∗ 91.4705∗∗∗ 96.7299∗∗∗ 75.5923∗∗∗ 77.4380∗∗∗ 95.5589∗∗∗ 79.6783∗∗∗ 78.1431∗∗∗
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Table VIII: Initial Return, Liquidity and Conditional Vaule-at-Risk for Confidence Level c = 0.99
CV aR is the conditional value-at-risk for confidence level c = 0.99. InitRtn is the return after the first day of trading. QuotedSp is the average proportional quoted spread. RealSp is
the average proportional realised spread. Kyle λ is Kyle’s (1985) measure of the extent to which order flow impacts on prices. Kyle λ CN is Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ adjusted for
the number of shares outstanding and closing prices. Kyle λ CQ is Kyle’s (1985) proportional λ adjusted for the number of trades and closing prices. Illiquidity is the average ratio
of absolute daily returns to trading volume. Turnover is the average number of shares traded. UwRank measures underwriter reputation. NumUw is the number of underwriters in
the IPO. V C − backed indicates venture capital backed IPO. EBITDA are earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization. EBITDADum is a dummy variable, coded
one if EBITDA is negative. Assets are assets at book value. Leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets. Sales is annual sales. Age is firm age. αˆ is Leland and Pyle’s (1977)
signal of equity retained. Omega is the fraction of primary shares offered. OfferPrice is the offer price. Use is the number of uses of proceeds. Lock − in indicates the presence of
a lock-in period. OfferSize is the amount of primary and secondary money raised. AboDum indicates if OfferPrice is above the initial filing price range. BelDum indicates if
OfferPrice is below the initial filing price range. MktRet is the cumulative NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq index return. MktRisk is the variance of MktRet. Nasdaq indicates if an IPO
is a Nasdaq issue. Monday indicates if an IPO is issued or started trading on a Monday. NasdaqRef indicates if an IPO is issued after January 1997. MktBubble indicates if an
IPO is issued during the bubble period. HotMkt indicates if an IPO is issued during a hot new issue period. ColdMkt indicates if an IPO is issued during a cold new issue period.
Industry sector dummy variables capture differences in the cost of capital and business risk across industry sectors based on Koop and Li’s (2001) 12-industry sector classification:
OilGas is oil and gas, ChemProd is chemical products, Manuf is manufacturing, Computers is computers, ElectEq is electronic equipment, Transp is transportation, ScientifInst
is scientific instruments, Communic is communication, Utilities is utilities, Retail is retail, FinServ is financial services, Health is health. Details on variable definitions are available
from Table III. ***, **, * denote 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. Significance levels are adjusted for robust standard errors.
CVaR0.99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
InitRtn 0.0068∗
(0.0037)
QuotedSp 0.9117∗∗∗
(0.1185)
RealSp 1.4148∗∗∗
(0.1381)
Kyle λ 0.0024∗∗
(0.0011)
Kyle λ CN 0.0006∗∗∗
(0.0002)
Kyle λ CQ 0.3830∗∗∗
(0.0370)
Illiquidity 0.0042∗∗∗
(0.0012)
Turnover 0.8871∗∗∗
(0.2510)
UwRank 0.0008 0.0023∗∗ 0.0022∗∗ 0.0011 0.0008 0.0007 0.0013 0.0011
(0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009)
NumUw −0.0038∗ −0.0044∗∗ −0.0064∗∗∗ −0.0044∗∗ −0.0032 −0.0040∗∗ −0.0043∗∗ −0.0044∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0018)
VC-backed 0.0032 0.0021 0.0013 0.0029 0.0028 0.0026 0.0031 0.0043
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0034)
log(EBITDA) −0.0025∗ −0.0036∗∗ −0.0042∗∗∗ −0.0026∗ −0.0028∗ −0.0016 −0.0031∗∗ −0.0026∗
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015)
EBITDADum 0.0359∗∗∗ 0.0410∗∗∗ 0.0441∗∗∗ 0.0362∗∗∗ 0.0361∗∗∗ 0.0239∗∗ 0.0389∗∗∗ 0.0368∗∗∗
(0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0117) (0.0115) (0.0110) (0.0117) (0.0116)
log(Assets) −0.0085∗∗∗ −0.0079∗∗∗ −0.0078∗∗∗ −0.0089∗∗∗ −0.0094∗∗∗ −0.0078∗∗∗ −0.0088∗∗∗ −0.0076∗∗∗
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0017)
log(Leverage) −0.0001 −0.0006 −0.0005 −0.0001 −0.0001 0.0006 −0.0003 0.0003
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
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Table VIII — Continued
CVaR0.99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log(Sales) 0.0023∗ 0.0020 0.0022 0.0024∗ 0.0028∗∗ 0.0029∗∗ 0.0025∗ 0.0021
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014)
log(Age) −0.0018 −0.0025∗∗ −0.0025∗∗ −0.0021∗ −0.0022∗ −0.0018 −0.0018 −0.0016
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
αˆ −0.0069∗ −0.0117∗∗∗ −0.0116∗∗∗ −0.0085∗∗ −0.0022 −0.0022 −0.0082∗∗ −0.0088∗∗
(0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0036)
Omega 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0143∗∗∗ 0.0123∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0049)
log(OfferPrice) −0.0138∗∗ −0.0056 −0.0043 −0.0141∗∗ −0.0099∗ −0.0107∗∗ −0.0115∗∗ −0.0150∗∗∗
(0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0054) (0.0057) (0.0058)
log(1+Use) −0.0075∗∗ −0.0056∗ −0.0063∗ −0.0089∗∗∗ −0.0088∗∗∗ −0.0071∗∗ −0.0082∗∗ −0.0069∗∗
(0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Lock-in 0.0086∗∗∗ 0.0089∗∗∗ 0.0087∗∗ 0.0098∗∗∗ 0.0082∗∗ 0.0058∗ 0.0093∗∗∗ 0.0077∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0033)
log(OfferSize) 0.0055∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0087∗∗∗ 0.0066∗∗ 0.0022 0.0078∗∗∗ 0.0038
(0.0027) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0027)
AboDum 0.0048 0.0062∗ 0.0064∗ 0.0061∗ 0.0066∗ 0.0039 0.0058∗ 0.0058
(0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0035)
BelDum 0.0003 −0.0013 −0.0001 −0.0004 −0.0013 0.0001 −0.0008 0.0005
(0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0036)
MktRtn −0.0832∗∗∗ −0.0828∗∗∗ −0.0752∗∗∗ −0.0841∗∗∗ −0.0809∗∗∗ −0.0940∗∗∗ −0.0778∗∗∗ −0.0891∗∗∗
(0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0203) (0.0198) (0.0204) (0.0205)
MktRisk 0.1819∗∗∗ 0.1486∗∗∗ 0.1466∗∗∗ 0.1697∗∗∗ 0.1648∗∗∗ 0.1430∗∗∗ 0.1730∗∗∗ 0.1805∗∗∗
(0.0214) (0.0211) (0.0210) (0.0216) (0.0220) (0.0212) (0.0210) (0.0211)
Nasdaq 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗∗ 0.0045 0.0141∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗∗ 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗∗ 0.0091∗∗∗
(0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0033)
Monday −0.0001 −0.0010 −0.0017 −0.0001 −0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0002
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0036)
NasdaqRef −0.00004 0.0174∗∗∗ 0.0196∗∗∗ 0.0012 0.0011 0.0018 0.0012 0.0001
(0.0040) (0.0043) (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0040) (0.0040)
MktBubble 0.0472∗∗∗ 0.0469∗∗∗ 0.0458∗∗∗ 0.0495∗∗∗ 0.0488∗∗∗ 0.0335∗∗∗ 0.0499∗∗∗ 0.0462∗∗∗
(0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0058)
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Table VIII — Continued
CVaR0.99
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
HotMkt 0.0034 0.0053 0.0048 0.0042 0.0033 0.0016 0.0042 0.0043
(0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0059) (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0057)
ColdMkt 0.0070 0.0014 0.0023 0.0068 0.0081 0.0078 0.0074 0.0067
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0072) (0.0078) (0.0076)
OilGas −0.0097∗ −0.0074 −0.0092 −0.0104∗ −0.0108∗ −0.0123∗∗ −0.0099∗ −0.0090
(0.0058) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0055) (0.0058) (0.0057)
ChemProd 0.0003 −0.0005 −0.0008 −0.0006 −0.0014 0.0030 −0.0008 0.0015
(0.0064) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0061) (0.0065) (0.0063)
Manuf 0.00004 0.0044 0.0051 0.0014 0.0012 0.0002 0.0014 0.0002
(0.0060) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0059)
Computers 0.0120∗∗∗ 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0152∗∗∗ 0.0129∗∗∗ 0.0130∗∗∗ 0.0079∗∗ 0.0133∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0039)
ElectEq 0.0150∗∗∗ 0.0188∗∗∗ 0.0180∗∗∗ 0.0151∗∗∗ 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0099∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ 0.0140∗∗
(0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0056)
Transp −0.0032 0.0007 −0.0002 −0.0030 −0.0023 −0.0027 −0.0024 −0.0035
(0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0062)
ScientificInst 0.0064 0.0065 0.0064 0.0066 0.0066 0.0079 0.0067 0.0073
(0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0053) (0.0057) (0.0056)
Communic 0.0012 −0.0011 −0.0025 −0.0005 0.0027 0.0030 −0.0009 −0.0009
(0.0062) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0062)
Utilities −0.0155∗ −0.0146∗ −0.0165∗ −0.0156∗ −0.0152∗ −0.0127 −0.0143∗ −0.0150∗
(0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0085) (0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0083)
Retail 0.0107∗∗ 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0145∗∗∗ 0.0106∗∗ 0.0108∗∗ 0.0069 0.0117∗∗ 0.0101∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048)
FinServ −0.0043 −0.0055 −0.0060 −0.0042 −0.0035 −0.0021 −0.0042 −0.0036
(0.0049) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0049)
Health −0.0019 0.0022 0.0023 −0.0016 −0.0021 −0.0026 −0.0009 −0.0016
(0.0095) (0.0092) (0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0094) (0.0091) (0.0094) (0.0094)
Constant 0.1191∗∗∗ 0.0234 0.0252 0.1043∗∗∗ 0.1049∗∗∗ 0.1120∗∗∗ 0.1003∗∗∗ 0.1223∗∗∗
(0.0135) (0.0173) (0.0163) (0.0145) (0.0135) (0.0129) (0.0139) (0.0137)
Observations 2, 413 2, 286 2, 286 2, 409 2, 409 2, 409 2, 413 2, 413
Adjusted R2 0.3607 0.3915 0.3935 0.3625 0.3660 0.4021 0.3659 0.3668
F Statistic 36.8143∗∗∗ 39.6896∗ ∗ ∗ 40.0083∗∗∗ 37.0273∗∗∗ 37.5803∗∗∗ 43.6116∗∗∗ 37.6291∗∗∗ 37.7720∗∗∗
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Figure 1: Quantile Regressions for Initial Return
Graphs plot Initial Return (InitRtn) slope coefficients of estimated linear quantile regressions for value-at-risk confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99} and for conditional value-at-risk confidence levels
c = {0.95, 0.99} as a function of τ . Quantile regressions have τ values from 0.05 to 0.95 with step size 0.05. Continuous black lines represent values of quantile regression coefficients at different levels
of τ . Grey areas indicate 90% confidence intervals of quantile regression coefficients. Continuous red lines represent values of least squares regression coefficients. Dashed red lines represent 90%
confidence intervals of least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the middle row of the figure show coefficient values for Initial Return (InitRtn) at each level of τ and their corresponding
significance values. Significance levels are adjusted for robust standard errors. Coefficient values for all remaining variables reported in Table V to Table VIII are omitted for brevity reasons. †
indicates that a coefficient in relation to the τ th quantile is outside the 90% confidence interval (CI) of the least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the bottom row of the figure report tests
of equality of quantile regression coefficients across different levels of τ . F -statistics test for pairwise equality of slope coefficients across different quantiles of τ . p-values report the corresponding
confidence levels of F -tests.
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τ Coefficient p-value
0.05 0.0057 0.0015
0.10 0.0056 0.0001
0.15 0.0062 0.0000
0.20 0.0066 0.0000
0.25 0.0069 0.0000
0.30 0.0071 0.0000
0.35 0.0065 0.0000
0.40 0.0066 0.0000
0.45 0.0055 0.0000
0.50 0.0060 0.0002
0.55 0.0065 0.0000
0.60 0.0073 0.0000
0.65 0.0060 0.0000
0.70 0.0063 0.0002
0.75 0.0079 0.0000
0.80 0.0074 0.0000
0.85 0.0063 0.0000
0.90 0.0061 0.0000
0.95 0.0029† 0.0439
OLS 0.0065 0.0000
CI: 0.0050, 0.0081
τ Coefficient p-value
0.05 0.0074 0.0000
0.10 0.0076 0.0002
0.15 0.0064 0.0000
0.20 0.0054 0.0414
0.25 0.0081 0.0058
0.30 0.0080 0.0002
0.35 0.0089 0.0003
0.40 0.0087 0.0003
0.45 0.0102 0.0000
0.50 0.0099 0.0000
0.55 0.0093 0.0000
0.60 0.0093 0.0001
0.65 0.0106† 0.0000
0.70 0.0083 0.0000
0.75 0.0084 0.0003
0.80 0.0094 0.0000
0.85 0.0078 0.0049
0.90 0.0075 0.1533
0.95 0.0071 0.1160
OLS 0.0077 0.0007
CI: 0.0048, 0.0105
τ Coefficient p-value
0.05 0.0063 0.0000
0.10 0.0065 0.0000
0.15 0.0070 0.0000
0.20 0.0065 0.0010
0.25 0.0072 0.0006
0.30 0.0085 0.0000
0.35 0.0093 0.0000
0.40 0.0081 0.0000
0.45 0.0078 0.0000
0.50 0.0072 0.0000
0.55 0.0080 0.0000
0.60 0.0087 0.0000
0.65 0.0085 0.0000
0.70 0.0086 0.0000
0.75 0.0091 0.0000
0.80 0.0088 0.0000
0.85 0.0086 0.0000
0.90 0.0061 0.1789
0.95 0.0052 0.1876
OLS 0.0070 0.0002
CI: 0.0047, 0.0094
τ Coefficient p-value
0.05 0.0077 0.0121
0.10 0.0079 0.0001
0.15 0.0061 0.0001
0.20 0.0071 0.0165
0.25 0.0064 0.0000
0.30 0.0055 0.1687
0.35 0.0092 0.0454
0.40 0.0126† 0.0086
0.45 0.0140† 0.0001
0.50 0.0130† 0.0000
0.55 0.0124† 0.0000
0.60 0.0112 0.0000
0.65 0.0101 0.0169
0.70 0.0108 0.0104
0.75 0.0119† 0.0016
0.80 0.0084 0.0151
0.85 0.0031 0.5469
0.90 0.0042 0.6975
0.95 0.0070 0.4482
OLS 0.0068 0.0644
CI: 0.0016, 0.0119
τ Equality p-value
0.25,0.50 3.8207 0.0000
0.50,0.75 2.6638 0.0000
0.25,0.75 5.7787 0.0000
0.05,0.95 6.4313 0.0000
τ Equality p-value
0.25,0.50 3.9688 0.0000
0.50,0.75 2.6849 0.0000
0.25,0.75 4.4999 0.0000
0.05,0.95 5.5466 0.0000
τ Equality p-value
0.25,0.50 3.8378 0.0000
0.50,0.75 3.7200 0.0000
0.25,0.75 7.1980 0.0000
0.05,0.95 4.9773 0.0000
τ Equality p-value
0.25,0.50 3.5381 0.0000
0.50,0.75 1.8621 0.0011
0.25,0.75 4.8047 0.0000
0.05,0.95 7.4484 0.0000
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Figure 2: Quantile Regressions for Quoted Spread
Graphs plot Quoted Spread (QuotedSp) slope coefficients of estimated linear quantile regressions for value-at-risk confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99} and for conditional value-at-risk confidence levels
c = {0.95, 0.99} as a function of τ . Quantile regressions have τ values from 0.05 to 0.95 with step size 0.05. Continuous black lines represent values of quantile regression coefficients at different levels
of τ . Grey areas indicate 90% confidence intervals of quantile regression coefficients. Continuous red lines represent values of least squares regression coefficients. Dashed red lines represent 90%
confidence intervals of least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the middle row of the figure show coefficient values for Quoted Spread (QuotedSp) at each level of τ and their corresponding
significance values. Significance levels are adjusted for robust standard errors. Coefficient values for all remaining variables reported in Table V to Table VIII are omitted for brevity reasons. †
indicates that a coefficient in relation to the τ th quantile is outside the 90% confidence interval (CI) of the least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the bottom row of the figure report tests
of equality of quantile regression coefficients across different levels of τ . F -statistics test for pairwise equality of slope coefficients across different quantiles of τ . p-values report the corresponding
confidence levels of F -tests.
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Figure 3: Quantile Regressions for Realised Spread
Graphs plot Realised Spread (RealSp) slope coefficients of estimated linear quantile regressions for value-at-risk confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99} and for conditional value-at-risk confidence levels
c = {0.95, 0.99} as a function of τ . Quantile regressions have τ values from 0.05 to 0.95 with step size 0.05. Continuous black lines represent values of quantile regression coefficients at different levels
of τ . Grey areas indicate 90% confidence intervals of quantile regression coefficients. Continuous red lines represent values of least squares regression coefficients. Dashed red lines represent 90%
confidence intervals of least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the middle row of the figure show coefficient values for Realised Spread (RealSp) at each level of τ and their corresponding
significance values. Significance levels are adjusted for robust standard errors. Coefficient values for all remaining variables reported in Table V to Table VIII are omitted for brevity reasons. †
indicates that a coefficient in relation to the τ th quantile is outside the 90% confidence interval (CI) of the least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the bottom row of the figure report tests
of equality of quantile regression coefficients across different levels of τ . F -statistics test for pairwise equality of slope coefficients across different quantiles of τ . p-values report the corresponding
confidence levels of F -tests.
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Figure 4: Quantile Regressions for Kyle’s λ
Graphs plot Kyle’s (1985) λ (Kyle λ) slope coefficients of estimated linear quantile regressions for value-at-risk confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99} and for conditional value-at-risk confidence levels
c = {0.95, 0.99} as a function of τ . Quantile regressions have τ values from 0.05 to 0.95 with step size 0.05. Continuous black lines represent values of quantile regression coefficients at different levels
of τ . Grey areas indicate 90% confidence intervals of quantile regression coefficients. Continuous red lines represent values of least squares regression coefficients. Dashed red lines represent 90%
confidence intervals of least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the middle row of the figure show coefficient values for Kyle’s (1985) λ (Kyle λ) at each level of τ and their corresponding
significance values. Significance levels are adjusted for robust standard errors. Coefficient values for all remaining variables reported in Table V to Table VIII are omitted for brevity reasons. †
indicates that a coefficient in relation to the τ th quantile is outside the 90% confidence interval (CI) of the least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the bottom row of the figure report tests
of equality of quantile regression coefficients across different levels of τ . F -statistics test for pairwise equality of slope coefficients across different quantiles of τ . p-values report the corresponding
confidence levels of F -tests.
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Figure 5: Quantile Regressions for Kyle’s λ CN
Graphs plot Kyle’s (1985) λ CN (Kyle λ CN) slope coefficients of estimated linear quantile regressions for value-at-risk confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99} and for conditional value-at-risk confidence
levels c = {0.95, 0.99} as a function of τ . Quantile regressions have τ values from 0.05 to 0.95 with step size 0.05. Continuous black lines represent values of quantile regression coefficients at
different levels of τ . Grey areas indicate 90% confidence intervals of quantile regression coefficients. Continuous red lines represent values of least squares regression coefficients. Dashed red lines
represent 90% confidence intervals of least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the middle row of the figure show coefficient values for Kyle’s (1985) λ CN (Kyle λ CN) at each level of τ
and their corresponding significance values. Significance levels are adjusted for robust standard errors. Coefficient values for all remaining variables reported in Table V to Table VIII are omitted
for brevity reasons. † indicates that a coefficient in relation to the τ th quantile is outside the 90% confidence interval (CI) of the least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the bottom row
of the figure report tests of equality of quantile regression coefficients across different levels of τ . F -statistics test for pairwise equality of slope coefficients across different quantiles of τ . p-values
report the corresponding confidence levels of F -tests.
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Figure 6: Quantile Regressions for Kyle’s λ CQ
Graphs plot Kyle’s (1985) λ CQ (Kyle λ CQ) slope coefficients of estimated linear quantile regressions for value-at-risk confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99} and for conditional value-at-risk confidence
levels c = {0.95, 0.99} as a function of τ . Quantile regressions have τ values from 0.05 to 0.95 with step size 0.05. Continuous black lines represent values of quantile regression coefficients at
different levels of τ . Grey areas indicate 90% confidence intervals of quantile regression coefficients. Continuous red lines represent values of least squares regression coefficients. Dashed red lines
represent 90% confidence intervals of least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the middle row of the figure show coefficient values for Kyle’s (1985) λ CQ (Kyle λ CQ) at each level of τ
and their corresponding significance values. Significance levels are adjusted for robust standard errors. Coefficient values for all remaining variables reported in Table V to Table VIII are omitted
for brevity reasons. † indicates that a coefficient in relation to the τ th quantile is outside the 90% confidence interval (CI) of the least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the bottom row
of the figure report tests of equality of quantile regression coefficients across different levels of τ . F -statistics test for pairwise equality of slope coefficients across different quantiles of τ . p-values
report the corresponding confidence levels of F -tests.
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Figure 7: Quantile Regressions for Illiquidity
Graphs plot Illiquidity (Illiquidity) slope coefficients of estimated linear quantile regressions for value-at-risk confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99} and for conditional value-at-risk confidence levels
c = {0.95, 0.99} as a function of τ . Quantile regressions have τ values from 0.05 to 0.95 with step size 0.05. Continuous black lines represent values of quantile regression coefficients at different
levels of τ . Grey areas indicate 90% confidence intervals of quantile regression coefficients. Continuous red lines represent values of least squares regression coefficients. Dashed red lines represent
90% confidence intervals of least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the middle row of the figure show coefficient values for Illiquidity (Illiquidity) at each level of τ and their corresponding
significance values. Significance levels are adjusted for robust standard errors. Coefficient values for all remaining variables reported in Table V to Table VIII are omitted for brevity reasons. †
indicates that a coefficient in relation to the τ th quantile is outside the 90% confidence interval (CI) of the least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the bottom row of the figure report tests
of equality of quantile regression coefficients across different levels of τ . F -statistics test for pairwise equality of slope coefficients across different quantiles of τ . p-values report the corresponding
confidence levels of F -tests.
VaR0.95
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
.
0
0
1
0
.
0
0
2
0
.
0
0
3
0
.
0
0
4
0
.
0
0
5
0
.
0
0
6
Quantile
VaR0.99
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
.
0
0
2
0
.
0
0
4
0
.
0
0
6
0
.
0
0
8
0
.
0
1
0
Quantile
CVaR0.95
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
.
0
0
2
0
.
0
0
4
0
.
0
0
6
0
.
0
0
8
Quantile
CVaR0.99
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.80
.
0
0
0
0
.
0
0
5
0
.
0
1
0
0
.
0
1
5
Quantile
τ Coefficient p-value
0.05 0.0022† 0.0000
0.10 0.0021† 0.0000
0.15 0.0020† 0.0000
0.20 0.0022† 0.0000
0.25 0.0020† 0.0042
0.30 0.0029 0.0007
0.35 0.0033 0.0000
0.40 0.0036† 0.0000
0.45 0.0038† 0.0000
0.50 0.0037† 0.0000
0.55 0.0039† 0.0000
0.60 0.0041† 0.0000
0.65 0.0041† 0.0000
0.70 0.0042† 0.0000
0.75 0.0042† 0.0000
0.80 0.0042† 0.0000
0.85 0.0043† 0.0000
0.90 0.0045† 0.0000
0.95 0.0049† 0.0000
OLS 0.0030 0.0000
CI: 0.0026, 0.0035
τ Coefficient p-value
0.05 0.0025† 0.0150
0.10 0.0026† 0.0000
0.15 0.0026† 0.0000
0.20 0.0023† 0.0002
0.25 0.0026† 0.0005
0.30 0.0027† 0.0000
0.35 0.0030† 0.0022
0.40 0.0035 0.0112
0.45 0.0047 0.0005
0.50 0.0047 0.0000
0.55 0.0049† 0.0000
0.60 0.0053† 0.0000
0.65 0.0048† 0.0000
0.70 0.0053† 0.0000
0.75 0.0055† 0.0000
0.80 0.0051† 0.0001
0.85 0.0069† 0.0022
0.90 0.0074† 0.0000
0.95 0.0081† 0.0000
OLS 0.0039 0.0000
CI: 0.0031, 0.0047
τ Coefficient p-value
0.05 0.0025† 0.0000
0.10 0.0025† 0.0000
0.15 0.0023† 0.0000
0.20 0.0022† 0.0033
0.25 0.0028† 0.0003
0.30 0.0028† 0.0001
0.35 0.0029 0.0000
0.40 0.0032 0.0037
0.45 0.0042 0.0001
0.50 0.0045† 0.0000
0.55 0.0047† 0.0000
0.60 0.0050† 0.0000
0.65 0.0044† 0.0000
0.70 0.0046† 0.0000
0.75 0.0050† 0.0000
0.80 0.0046† 0.0000
0.85 0.0053† 0.0000
0.90 0.0057† 0.0000
0.95 0.0061† 0.0003
OLS 0.0036 0.0000
CI: 0.0029, 0.0042
τ Coefficient p-value
0.05 0.0024† 0.0151
0.10 0.0021† 0.0911
0.15 0.0028 0.0000
0.20 0.0025† 0.0004
0.25 0.0023† 0.0057
0.30 0.0027† 0.0615
0.35 0.0032 0.0293
0.40 0.0038 0.0227
0.45 0.0043 0.0002
0.50 0.0044 0.0000
0.55 0.0040 0.0001
0.60 0.0050 0.0093
0.65 0.0055 0.0104
0.70 0.0062† 0.0016
0.75 0.0076† 0.0000
0.80 0.0062† 0.0046
0.85 0.0085† 0.0307
0.90 0.0103† 0.0000
0.95 0.0074† 0.0009
OLS 0.0042 0.0004
CI: 0.0028, 0.0056
τ Equality p-
value
0.25,0.50 4.1068 0.0000
0.50,0.75 2.2288 0.0000
0.25,0.75 5.0778 0.0000
0.05,0.95 21.8090 0.0000
τ Equality p-value
0.25,0.50 3.8276 0.0000
0.50,0.75 2.5187 0.0000
0.25,0.75 5.1942 0.0000
0.05,0.95 7.1394 0.0000
τ Equality p-value
0.25,0.50 3.2047 0.0000
0.50,0.75 2.2005 0.0000
0.25,0.75 5.2843 0.0000
0.05,0.95 9.8499 0.0000
τ Equality p-value
0.25,0.50 3.1198 0.0000
0.50,0.75 2.2446 0.0000
0.25,0.75 5.4576 0.0000
0.05,0.95 4.4860 0.0000
48
Figure 8: Quantile Regressions for Turnover
Graphs plot Turnover (Turnover) slope coefficients of estimated linear quantile regressions for value-at-risk confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99} and for conditional value-at-risk confidence levels
c = {0.95, 0.99} as a function of τ . Quantile regressions have τ values from 0.05 to 0.95 with step size 0.05. Continuous black lines represent values of quantile regression coefficients at different
levels of τ . Grey areas indicate 90% confidence intervals of quantile regression coefficients. Continuous red lines represent values of least squares regression coefficients. Dashed red lines represent
90% confidence intervals of least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the middle row of the figure show coefficient values for turnover (Turnover) at each level of τ and their corresponding
significance values. Significance levels are adjusted for robust standard errors. Coefficient values for all remaining variables reported in Table V to Table VIII are omitted for brevity reasons. †
indicates that a coefficient in relation to the τ th quantile is outside the 90% confidence interval (CI) of the least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the bottom row of the figure report tests
of equality of quantile regression coefficients across different levels of τ . F -statistics test for pairwise equality of slope coefficients across different quantiles of τ . p-values report the corresponding
confidence levels of F -tests.
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Figure 9: Quantile Regressions for Underwriter Reputation
Graphs plot underwriter reputation (UwRank) slope coefficients of estimated linear quantile regressions for value-at-risk confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99} as a function of τ . Quantile regressions
have τ values from 0.05 to 0.95 with step size 0.05. Continuous black lines represent values of quantile regression coefficients at different levels of τ . Grey areas indicate 90% confidence intervals
of quantile regression coefficients. Continuous red lines represent values of least squares regression coefficients. Dashed red lines represent 90% confidence intervals of least squares regression
coefficients. Tables across the middle row of the figure show coefficient values for underwriter reputation (UwRank) at each level of τ and their corresponding significance values. Significance levels
are adjusted for robust standard errors. Coefficient values for all remaining variables reported in Table V to Table VIII are omitted for brevity reasons. † indicates that a coefficient in relation
to the τ th quantile is outside the 90% confidence interval (CI) of the least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the bottom row of the figure report tests of equality of quantile regression
coefficients across different levels of τ . F -statistics test for pairwise equality of slope coefficients across different quantiles of τ . p-values report the corresponding confidence levels of F -tests.
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Figure 10: Quantile Regressions for Number of Underwriters in Syndicate
Graphs plot the number of underwriters in a syndicate (NumUW ) slope coefficients of estimated linear quantile regressions for value-at-risk confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99} as a function of τ .
Quantile regressions have τ values from 0.05 to 0.95 with step size 0.05. Continuous black lines represent values of quantile regression coefficients at different levels of τ . Grey areas indicate 90%
confidence intervals of quantile regression coefficients. Continuous red lines represent values of least squares regression coefficients. Dashed red lines represent 90% confidence intervals of least
squares regression coefficients. Tables across the middle row of the figure show coefficient values for number of underwriters in a syndicate (NumUW ) at each level of τ and their corresponding
significance values. Significance levels are adjusted for robust standard errors. Coefficient values for all remaining variables reported in Table V to Table VIII are omitted for brevity reasons. †
indicates that a coefficient in relation to the τ th quantile is outside the 90% confidence interval (CI) of the least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the bottom row of the figure report tests
of equality of quantile regression coefficients across different levels of τ . F -statistics test for pairwise equality of slope coefficients across different quantiles of τ . p-values report the corresponding
confidence levels of F -tests.
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0.50 −0.0012 0.1917
0.55 −0.0011 0.3228
0.60 −0.0007 0.5363
0.65 0.0002† 0.9121
0.70 0.0005† 0.6676
0.75 0.0011† 0.2901
0.80 0.0002† 0.8530
0.85 −0.0006 0.5978
0.90 −0.0004 0.7369
0.95 −0.0022 0.1966
OLS −0.0020 0.0419
CI: -0.0036, -0.0003
τ Coefficient p-value
0.05 −0.0050 0.0010
0.10 −0.0035 0.0033
0.15 −0.0020 0.2098
0.20 −0.0017 0.0969
0.25 −0.0026 0.0010
0.30 −0.0028 0.0053
0.35 −0.0025 0.0105
0.40 −0.0025 0.0234
0.45 −0.0033 0.0002
0.50 −0.0030 0.0525
0.55 −0.0031 0.0570
0.60 −0.0033 0.1270
0.65 −0.0026 0.2626
0.70 −0.0012 0.6161
0.75 −0.0011 0.5299
0.80 −0.0013 0.4680
0.85 −0.0022 0.4045
0.90 −0.0045 0.2258
0.95 −0.0070 0.2950
OLS −0.0044 0.0281
CI: -0.0080, -0.0008
τ Equality p-
value
0.25,0.50 4.3689 0.0000
0.50,0.75 3.7052 0.0000
0.25,0.75 7.0511 0.0000
0.05,0.95 11.3880 0.0000
τ Equality p-value
0.25,0.50 4.2490 0.0000
0.50,0.75 2.5652 0.0000
0.25,0.75 5.2978 0.0000
0.05,0.95 5.4521 0.0000
τ Equality p-value
0.25,0.50 3.3105 0.0000
0.50,0.75 2.8976 0.0000
0.25,0.75 6.2452 0.0000
0.05,0.95 5.7522 0.0000
τ Equality p-value
0.25,0.50 3.2375 0.0000
0.50,0.75 2.4037 0.0000
0.25,0.75 5.4369 0.0000
0.05,0.95 6.8706 0.0000
51
Figure 11: Quantile Regressions for Venture Capital Backed IPOs
Graphs plot venture capital-backed (V C − backed) slope coefficients of estimated linear quantile regressions for value-at-risk confidence levels c = {0.95, 0.99} as a function of τ . Quantile regressions
have τ values from 0.05 to 0.95 with step size 0.05. Continuous black lines represent values of quantile regression coefficients at different levels of τ . Grey areas indicate 90% confidence intervals of
quantile regression coefficients. Continuous red lines represent values of least squares regression coefficients. Dashed red lines represent 90% confidence intervals of least squares regression coefficients.
Tables across the middle row of the figure show coefficient values for venture capital-backed IPOs (V C − backed) at each level of τ and their corresponding significance values. Significance levels
are adjusted for robust standard errors. Coefficient values for all remaining variables reported in Table V to Table VIII are omitted for brevity reasons. † indicates that a coefficient in relation
to the τ th quantile is outside the 90% confidence interval (CI) of the least squares regression coefficients. Tables across the bottom row of the figure report tests of equality of quantile regression
coefficients across different levels of τ . F -statistics test for pairwise equality of slope coefficients across different quantiles of τ . p-values report the corresponding confidence levels of F -tests.
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τ Coefficient p-value
0.05 0.0003 0.6860
0.10 −0.0002 0.7560
0.15 −0.0013 0.0469
0.20 −0.0011 0.2074
0.25 −0.0004 0.6365
0.30 −0.0009 0.1837
0.35 0.0003 0.7158
0.40 0.0006 0.4785
0.45 0.0003 0.6387
0.50 0.0010 0.1249
0.55 0.0008 0.3188
0.60 0.0012 0.2418
0.65 0.0006 0.5810
0.70 0.0007 0.3644
0.75 −0.0010 0.2069
0.80 −0.0012 0.4585
0.85 0.0011 0.4545
0.90 0.0007 0.5778
0.95 0.0013 0.5384
OLS 0.0004 0.7224
CI: -0.0015, 0.0022
τ Coefficient p-value
0.05 0.0014 0.2155
0.10 0.0010 0.2449
0.15 0.0009 0.3693
0.20 0.0003 0.7612
0.25 0.0008 0.6027
0.30 0.0026 0.1255
0.35 0.0030 0.0301
0.40 0.0023 0.0572
0.45 0.0014 0.2389
0.50 0.0017 0.2378
0.55 0.0018 0.3417
0.60 0.0025 0.1880
0.65 0.0025 0.2285
0.70 0.0022 0.2390
0.75 0.0014 0.4444
0.80 0.0024 0.4292
0.85 0.0033 0.2323
0.90 0.0011 0.6701
0.95 −0.0020† 0.6645
OLS 0.0017 0.3777
CI: -0.0018, 0.0052
τ Coefficient p-value
0.05 0.0007 0.4440
0.10 0.0013 0.1890
0.15 0.0002 0.8429
0.20 0.0002 0.8255
0.25 0.0006 0.6334
0.30 0.0017 0.2647
0.35 0.0025 0.0345
0.40 0.0021 0.0300
0.45 0.0019 0.1485
0.50 0.0021 0.1086
0.55 0.0020 0.1664
0.60 0.0015 0.2590
0.65 0.0014 0.3730
0.70 0.0010 0.5342
0.75 0.0010 0.5824
0.80 0.0013 0.5778
0.85 0.0023 0.3037
0.90 0.0017 0.4908
0.95 −0.0012 0.7067
OLS 0.0013 0.4355
CI: -0.0017, 0.0042
τ Coefficient p-value
0.05 −0.0001 0.9865
0.10 0.0008 0.5811
0.15 0.0013 0.3881
0.20 0.0030 0.1213
0.25 0.0041 0.0345
0.30 0.0042 0.0113
0.35 0.0031 0.1311
0.40 0.0036 0.1143
0.45 0.0049 0.0394
0.50 0.0042 0.0883
0.55 0.0054 0.0533
0.60 0.0045 0.1199
0.65 0.0051 0.0990
0.70 0.0038 0.3213
0.75 0.0036 0.2962
0.80 0.0027 0.4727
0.85 0.0022 0.6822
0.90 −0.0066† 0.3470
0.95 −0.0091† 0.4239
OLS 0.0030 0.3799
CI: -0.0033, 0.0094
τ Equality p-
value
0.25,0.50 4.3689 0.0000
0.50,0.75 3.7052 0.0000
0.25,0.75 7.0511 0.0000
0.05,0.95 11.3880 0.0000
τ Equality p-value
0.25,0.50 4.2490 0.0000
0.50,0.75 2.5652 0.0000
0.25,0.75 5.2978 0.0000
0.05,0.95 5.4521 0.0000
τ Equality p-value
0.25,0.50 3.3105 0.0000
0.50,0.75 2.8976 0.0000
0.25,0.75 6.2452 0.0000
0.05,0.95 5.7522 0.0000
τ Equality p-value
0.25,0.50 3.2375 0.0000
0.50,0.75 2.4037 0.0000
0.25,0.75 5.4369 0.0000
0.05,0.95 6.8706 0.0000
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